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                                                           ABSTRACT 
 
There are two opposing hypotheses regarding the informative role of stock prices. The 
first hypothesis argues that the stock market is merely a sideshow where security prices 
reflect the consequences of managers’ decisions for firms’ cash flows but do not 
influence them. In other words, trading in secondary markets has no direct impact on 
firms’ decisions. The second, known as the “active informant hypothesis”, states that 
security prices influence managers’ real decisions because some investors trade on 
private information not available to managers, who therefore rely on stock prices as a 
source of information. There is recent evidence supporting the latter hypothesis. In order 
to help elucidate this current debate, this dissertation examines the stock price 
informativeness of firms facing a product market threat and competition from their peers. 
I reason that when facing a threat, managers of firms tend to be more inquisitive about 
their price stock movements and also about the stock price movements of their peers. 
Indeed, my empirical analyses show that managers of firms facing higher product market 
threat and competition are more sensitive to the information contained in their stock 
prices. I also find that firms learn more from their peers’ stock price movements as the 
level threat is greater except when the threat is at its highest level.  
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                                                           CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
“(An efficient market) has a very desirable feature. In particular, at any point in 
time market prices of securities provide accurate signals for resource allocation; 
that is, firms can make production-investment decisions, and consumers can 
choose among the securities that represent ownership of firms’ activities under 
the presumption that security prices at any time “fully reflect” all available 
information. A market in which prices fully reflect available information is called 
efficient.” —Eugene Fama and Merton Miller, the Theory of Finance (1972, p 
335) 
“Our examiners are extremely good at what they do, but any good examiner 
recognizes that data should come from a variety of different sources, including 
the signals that come from the market.  Therefore, market discipline can be an 
important adjunct to the supervisory process.” —Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., Ex 
Vice Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2005). 
“The stock market rally of the past four years shows that capital expenditure is 
not an essential driver for equities,” says Pierre Lapointe, head of global strategy 
and research at Pavilion Global Markets in Montreal. He also adds “However, 
history tells us that companies that grow their capital expenditure programs 
usually do much better than companies that do not.” 
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The contribution of the financial sector to the economy has become 
increasingly pervasive in the past two decades. Going all the way back to 
Schumpeter (1911), the financial literature abounds with articles that show that a 
well-functioning financial system contributes positively to a country’s economic 
growth. To cite a few, King and Levine (1993), Levine and Zervos (1998), and 
Rajan and Zingales (1997) link capital markets and economic growth and all 
argue that a more developed financial sector leads to economic growth. Merton 
and Bodie (1995) argue that the main role of a financial sector is to allocate 
economic resources in a risky environment. This role has been further subdivided 
by Levine (2005) into five categories: First to transmit information about possible 
investments and capital allocation, second to monitor investments and exert 
corporate control, third to facilitate diversification and management of 
uncertainty, fourth to mobilize and pool savings, and fifth to facilitate the 
exchange of goods and services. This dissertation is mainly concerned with the 
first role of financial markets (its informative role) and in particular how the 
information in the stock price movements is channeled which in turn reflects the 
efficiency of the financial markets. 
One of the most relevant issues in finance is market efficiency, which is 
defined as the extent to which market prices are informative about the value of 
traded assets and whether financial markets have an impact on the overall 
economy. Some economists argue that the debates over market efficiency would 
not as be prominent as they are if the stock market did not affect real economic 
activity.  Eugene Fama in his Foundations of Finance (1976, p 132) contends 
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that: “An efficient capital market is a market that is efficient in processing 
information. In an efficient market, prices “fully reflect available information”. 
 The issue of market efficiency has become particularly pertinent after the 
recent financial crisis which began in August 2007 and was triggered by 
consumer defaults on subprime mortgages and had significant adverse effects on 
the U.S. financial sector and caused the most dramatic bank failure in U.S. 
history. Consequently, more research has been devoted to examining the role of 
financial markets and whether they impact the real economy. In particular, a line 
of research investigates why managers constantly monitor the performance of 
their firm’s stock and how firms’ stock prices affect real managerial decisions. 
Corporate managers usually make three vital decisions namely, investment 
decisions, payout decisions, and financing decisions. Managers undertake 
investments in the sole purpose of ameliorating the future value of the firm. Since 
we know that share prices are forward looking and incorporate the information 
pertaining to the expected value of the firm, one would expect that investment and 
stock prices to be linked. The financial literature abounds with scholar articles 
that find a positive relationship between a firm’s investment and stock returns. 
However, there is no absolute consensus that the aforementioned relationship is 
always positive. Some scholars argue that the link between capital expenditure 
and stock return often hinges upon the characteristics of the firm in consideration. 
Some other scholars find that there is a negative relationship between corporate 
investment and stock market return. In this dissertation we incorporate the 
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element of threat and one of our goals is to help elucidate this debate and help 
reach some sort of consensus related to this very vital discussion. 
There are two main opposing views regarding the informative role of stock 
prices. The first view argues that the stock market is merely a sideshow where 
security prices reflect the consequences of managers’ decisions for firms’ cash 
flows but do not influence them. In other words, trading in secondary markets has 
no direct impact on firms’ decisions. The second, known as the “active informant 
hypothesis”, states that security prices influence managers’ real decisions because 
some investors trade on private information not available to managers, who 
therefore rely on stock prices a source of information.   
There is ample evidence that the stock market is not merely a sideshow but 
rather has an effect on real economic activity which is associated with the 
informational role of stock prices. In fact, the rationale behind the fact that real 
decision makers (or managers) learn from the information in the secondary 
market prices can be divided into three lines of reasoning. The first line of 
reasoning argues that managers learn from information in their firms’ stock prices 
and utilize this information to make real decisions. The idea was originally 
introduced by Hayek (1945) who argued that prices are a useful source of 
information. A financial market is a venue where many speculators with different 
pieces of information meet to trade, trying to capitalize on their information. 
Stock prices gather this myriad of pieces of information and present an accurate 
assessment of firm value which will be used by managers in order to guide their 
decisions. In other words, stock prices enable managers to utilize those diverse 
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pieces of information from different traders who have no other means of 
communicating with managers outside the trading process.  But the skeptics might 
ask how could managers learn from their own stock prices? They are closer to the 
firm than market traders and are expected to have superior information about the 
firm. The answer is quite simple: the informativeness of stock prices does not 
posit that managers have less information than other investors in the capital 
market, but rather decision makers do not possess perfect information related to 
their firm. Other investors may have additional information that could be 
beneficial to them. According to Grossman (1976) and Hellwig (1980), even 
though an individual investor may be less informed than the manager, the stock 
market price reflects the information of a collection of investors who on aggregate 
may be more informed. Furthermore, managerial decisions do not rely on internal 
information solely related to the firm, but also on information related to the 
economic environment, the industry outlook, the firm’s competitive position 
competition among other external sources of information. In fact, Allen (1993) 
contends that financial markets have become more informative as production 
processes have become more convoluted. The second line of reasoning argues that 
even if managers do not learn from stock prices, they are interested in market 
prices because their compensation is often linked to how the stock price of their 
firm fares. As a result, managers will make real decisions contingent on the extent 
to which they will impact their firm’s stock price which reverts us to the 
informational role of prices. Finally, the third line of reasoning is often preferred 
by behaviorist and assumes that managers irrationally rely on the stock price to 
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form their decisions and often use it as an anchor. They reason that real decision 
makers look at the price rather than other public signals because the price is often 
perceived to convey more information (Baker and Wurgler (2012)). 
There are three distinct hypotheses related to the informative role of financial 
markets and were introduced by Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) (MSV 
hereafter). MSV introduced the “passive informant” hypothesis which argues that 
the stock market is merely a sideshow and does not play any important role in 
allocating investment funds. It says that the firm’s decision makers know more 
than the public about the investment opportunities facing the firm. The market 
might tell the manager what market participants think about the firm's 
investments, but that does not influence his/her decisions. Their “accurate active 
informant” hypothesis states that the stock market plays a bigger role and that 
stock prices affect a firm’s investment because they convey to managers 
information which facilitates their decision making process. It argues that security 
price influence managers’ real decisions because some investors trade on private 
information not available to managers, who therefore rely on stock prices as a 
source of information. Their “faulty active informant” argues that managers’ 
decisions about investment are influenced by stock price movements, but 
managers cannot distinguish between movements reflecting fundamentals and 
those reflecting market “sentiment”.  One of this dissertation’s goals is to help 
elucidate this debate and show that the accurate active informant hypothesis is 
valid. 
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A recent stream of research argues that managers can learn valuable 
information about the prospects of their own firm from observing their stock 
price. This idea originates from Hayek’s (1945) intuition that stock prices 
efficiently aggregate information from various participants and hence help 
improving the allocation of resources. According to Fresard (2010) “The 
aggregation of information is permitted by the trading activity of diverse 
speculators that transmit their private information into market prices via their 
trades (e.g. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) or Kyle (1985)).Because these 
speculators may not have the possibility or willingness to share their information 
with managers directly, stock prices may incorporate specific information that 
managers do not possess. As a result, if (some) investors have information about a 
company’s prospects that those running the company ignore, the information 
embedded in stock prices may help reduce this information asymmetry and 
improve firms’ decisions.” 
The dissertation makes two main contributions to the finance literature. 
First, it contributes to the intensive literature that studies the interactions between 
product market competition and firms’ managers’ behavior. We show that the 
greater the threat the more attentive managers are to the information in their own 
stock market movements. We also find that the greater the competition a firm 
faces from its rivals the more sensitive managers are to the information contained 
in their peers’ stock price movements except when the level of threat is at its 
highest level. Second, we contribute to literature supporting the managerial 
learning hypothesis which states that managers do learn from their stock price 
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movements and their peer’s stock price movements and that the capital markets 
are not merely a sideshow. Product market threat seems to serve as a catalyst that 
induces managers to work more efficiently and be more attentive to the 
information contained in capital markets. 
Whether firm managers look at their stock price movements is a matter of 
paramount  importance. In fact, firms live and die by their stock price and the 
stock price movements are deemed to be of vital importance to the incumbent 
managers. The most evident reason why managers are concerned about the stock 
price of their corresponding firms is that they are most of the time shareholder too 
and have a stake in the company. Very often we find encounter cases where the 
founder of a public company to own a substantial number of the firm’s shares and 
we also find that the managers’ compensation is linked to how their stock and 
their compensation is under the form of stock options. It has been documented 
that tying a managers’ compensation with the stock price mitigates agency 
conflicts between managers and shareholders and align their interests. in other 
words, managers are in a way shareholders of the firm and as a result should pay 
attention to how the stock price of their firm behaves.  
Stocks represent ownership in a company and hence an investor in a firm 
is affected by how the stock movements of his/her firm. A manager’s’ goal is to 
maximize the expected utility or wealth of his/her shareholders and to create value 
for them and that could be achieved by maximizing the stock prices of the firm. In 
the short run, managers might not have great control over their firm’s stock price, 
but a continuous poor stock performance could reflect managers’ inaptitude to 
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manage the firm efficiently. In fact, if a firm’s stock price repeatedly 
underperforms the analysts forecast previsions and shareholders' expectations, the 
latter might consider replacing the incumbent managerial team. In case managers 
retrench and resist a change instigated by shareholders, a proxy fight could be 
utilized in order to replace the incumbent management. As a result, managers 
should always be aware of how their corresponding shareholders perceive their 
performance and the stock price of their firms is one barometer to achieve that 
goal.  As a consequence, stock prices are used by all market participants since 
they reflect the well-being of a firm. Traders are always looking for a profit 
opportunity and analysts are searching for good investments opportunities for 
their clients and stock prices are one measure to reach that end. Furthermore, 
creditors also tend to gauge whether firms are sound financially and are able to 
pay back their debt and one way of verifying that is too look at their stock prices.  
The link between a firm’s stock price and its financial credibility is mainly due to 
the inherent link between a firm’s earnings and its stock price. If a company has 
strong earnings, it shows stakeholders (creditors included) that the firm can meet 
its debt obligations which will permit the firms to take advantage of a lower 
capitalization rate which would maximize its return on investment and also make 
more projects worth undertaking. Furthermore, a good stock market performance 
is valuable for a firm in case it’s planning to issue more shares. A good 
performance in the capital market would allow the firm to issue more share at a 
profitable price.  
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Another reason why a firm’s manager should be concerned with its share 
price is due to the threat of takeover by other firms. If the stock price of the firm 
decreases significantly, other firms might consider turning around that firm by a 
means of a takeover. Many takeovers result in replacing the existing management. 
To that end, the acquiring company will be able to pay the firm’s shareholders a 
higher premium when stock prices are already low and hence that would 
maximize the chances of a takeover. Therefore, a strong stock performance could 
serve as deterrence for potential interested bidders and a poor one would serve as 
an invitation for potential acquirers.  
Furthermore, looking at the takeover from another perspective, a firm with 
a good stock performance has a better chance in case it decides to take over 
another firm and the takeover could be financed by issuing additional shares. 
Doing so would enable the acquiring firm managers to have more assets under 
their purview. The final reason why share prices might be of interest to managers 
is due to the fact that managers have a reputation to build and the stock price is 
one measure of how market participants perceive them. As a consequence, the 
higher the stock price, and the larger the market value of the company under their 
purview, and the more prestigious their occupation is. 
One of the premises of the efficient market hypothesis is that market 
participants are rational. A rational individual is supposed to make rational 
decisions under uncertainty which would maximize his/her utility. Behaviorists 
question the rationality of investors and managers alike. More studies reckon that 
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managers may not be always rational and suggest that their financing and 
investing decisions might suffer from irrationality. 
Going all the way back to the seminal paper by Miller and Modigliani and 
Miller (1958), many scholars have examined the investment decisions by 
managers and their firms’ capital structure. Most of those scholars have assumed 
that managers are rational. For instance Leland and Pyle (1977), Ross (1977), 
Myers and Majluf (1984) investigated the phenomenon is signaling by managers 
in case of information asymmetries assuming managers are rational. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), Grossman and Hart (1982), Jensen (1986), Dewatripoint and 
Tirole (1991), and Fairchild (2003)) investigated how the capital structure 
selected by managers could reduce agency conflicts between principals and 
agents. Their methodology uses a principal0agent model which assumes that the 
rationality of managers. 
Around the beginning of the last decade, more scholars started to reckon 
that managers’ decisions might be affected by behavioral shortcomings. For 
instance, Shefrin (1999), Heaton (2002), and Hackbarth (2002) have examined the 
link between managerial irrationality and capital structure. Statman and Caldwell 
1987, Shefrin (1999) , and Gervais et al 2003 analyzed how capital budgeting is 
affected by managers’ irrationality. Jensen and Meckling (1976) used a model 
where a manager could divert company funds for personal. The found that one 
way of aligning the manager’s interest with the one of shareholders is to increase 
the debt level and reduce external equity. 
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One of the behavioral biases affecting managers is managerial 
overconfidence. Kahnemann and Lovallo (1993), Shefrin (1999), Goel and 
Thakor (2000), Malmandier and Tate (2001), Heaton 2002, and Hackbarth 2004 
have all examined the phenomenon of managerial overconfidence. Heaton (2002) 
finds that agents tend to be overconfident and over-optimistic about matters they 
believe they can control. 
Traditional finance attempts to understand how financial markets function 
by using models in which agents are assumed to be rational. Rationality hinges on 
two distinct notions. The first notion is related to whether agents update their 
“prior” or beliefs correctly when new information arises as it is explained by 
Bayes’ law. The second notion is concerned with whether agents make acceptable 
choices based on their beliefs. Proponents of behavioral finance rely on the 
irrationality of financial market participants in order to argue against the efficient 
market hypothesis. While there is ample research which investigates the 
irrationality of investors, the question whether managers are rational is still 
limited. 
According to the ex-Chairman of the SEC, Arthur Levitt, “Quality 
information is the lifeblood of strong, vibrant markets. Without it, investor 
confidence erodes. Liquidity dries up. Fair and efficient markets simply cease to 
exist. As the quantity of information increases exponentially through the Internet 
and other technologies, the quality of that information must be our signal priority” 
The question whether asset prices reflect all relevant information is one of 
the most paramount topics in finance. Notwithstanding, an attempt to empirically 
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find a definite answer to that pertinent question is impeded by two major 
obstacles. First, information in not easily observable and differentiating between 
relevant and irrelevant information has proved to be not a facile task. Second, 
quantifying how information is processed by market participants has proved to be 
a daunting task.  
How information is processed in financial markets has been extensively 
examined in the finance literature. Several papers have investigated the process of 
trading and how stock prices vary around news releases (Harris and Raviv 1993, 
Kandel and Pearson 1995, and Blume, Easley, and O'Hara 1994). The gist of all 
those papers revolves around the fact that price reaction is mainly driven by the 
amount of unanticipated information. 
Little is known about how market participants and in particular how 
managers react to new information. As mentioned earlier, behaviorists’ focus has 
mainly been geared towards the irrationality of investors and they have 
overlooked the rationality/irrationality of managers. 
It has been established that stock prices carry new information which 
could be useful to managers. The idea dates back to Hayek (1945) who argued 
that financial market is a venue where many speculators with different pieces of 
information meet to trade, trying to capitalize on their information. Stock prices 
gather this myriad of pieces of information and present an accurate assessment of 
firm value which will could used by managers in order to guide their decisions 
and update their prior and beliefs. In other words, stock prices enable managers to 
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utilize those diverse pieces of information from different traders who have no 
other means of communicating with managers outside the trading process. 
This dissertation attempts to fill the aforementioned gap in behavioral 
finance research by exploring whether managers update their beliefs by extracting 
information from the stock price movements of their own firms and the ones 
corresponding to their peers. 
Some of the traits pertaining to the psyche of investors and which could be 
applied to managers’ behavior are belief perseverance and anchoring. According 
to Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979), once people have formed an opinion, they stick 
to it too tightly and for a long time. Barberis and Thaler (2003) cite that belief 
perseverance could be explained by the fact that when people once form an 
opinion, they tend to cling to it for a long time and they become too reticent to 
search for evidence against their beliefs. They also treat new evidence with 
skepticism. According to Kahneman and Tversky (1974), when people form 
estimates, they usually start with an arbitrary value and then adjust as new 
information comes in. Anchoring states that people “anchor” on the initial value 
and adjust very slowly to new information.  
These psychological traits could be easily translated to managers who 
might persevere in their beliefs and ignore any new information contained in the 
stock price of their own firms or their peers. Our analysis will determine whether 
managers show that kind of behavior toward the flow of new information, in 
particular, the information contained in stock price movements when the level of 
competition increases. Barberis et al (1998) discuss how a “conservatism bias” 
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might lead investors to underreact to information. In certain cases, in violation of 
Bayes’ rule, existing theories suggest that some investors tend to underreact to 
unexpected news events. The conservatism bias suggests that individuals 
underestimate new information in updating their expectations and as a 
consequence prices will tend to slowly adjust to information.  
According to Hirshleifer (2003), another psychological behavior that 
could be applied to managers is the phenomenon of “limited attention” which is a 
consequence of the large amount of information available out there and the limits 
to individuals’ processing power. Kahneman (1973) cites that attention is a scarce 
cognitive resource. It has been documented that there is a the cognitive-processing 
capacity of the human brain has a limit and that the phenomenon is limited 
attention is due to the substantial amount of information available to agents. The 
“ostrich effect” documented by Lowenstein and Seppi (2005) states that investors 
pay more attention to stocks when the market is rising, but ignore the stock prices 
when the markets are doing poorly. 
Kahhneman (1973) argues that attention must be selective and requires 
effort. Fiske (1995) that individuals encode information by taking external 
information and representing it internally in a way that is usable. According to 
Herb Simon “the scarce resource is not information; it is processing capacity to 
attend to information. Attention is the chief bottleneck in organizational activity, 
and the bottleneck becomes narrower and narrower as we move to the tops of 
organizations, where parallel processing capacity become less easy” (Simon 1973, 
page 270.).  
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Limited managerial attention has been investigated literature, but from 
different angles. Geanakoplos and Milgrom (1991) focus on how to allocate 
different tasks among managers with different ability and the optimal organization 
structure of a firm. Darrough and Melumad (1995) examine a setting in which a 
principal motivates a manager with unknown ability to allocate his effort between 
his own division and other division, and illustrate that sometimes it is optimal to 
motivate the manager to concentrate on his own. In this dissertation, we will 
investigate whether managers exhibit “limited attention” pertaining to the 
information in their stock price movements and the one pertaining to their peers 
and how the intention of managers changes with a higher level of competition 
from their peers. 
 
.On the other side of the spectrum, there is the phenomenon of “increased 
attention” where the agent makes an extra effort in order to serve his interests or 
the principal’s interests. Warner and Watt (1987) examine the relationship 
between the stock price movements of a firm and the subsequent top management 
changes. They find an inverse relationship between the two. As a result, managers 
ought to look at the stock price movements since they reflect whether their job is 
in jeopardy and that would be even more pronounced when their firm is facing 
higher threat from competitors. 
Another benefit of managers inquiring about their stock price movements 
and the ones of their peers is the fact that they will be able to reduce any 
information asymmetry between the informed investors and the less informed 
ones. Furthermore, it has been documented that when the level of competition is 
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higher, the degree of exploitation of private information is lower (Holden and 
Subrahmanyam 1992, 1994; Foster and Viswanathan 1993, 1994, 1996). This 
occurs because competition leads private information to be incorporated into 
prices more quickly (i.e., prices become more informative about fundamental 
value). This effect has two potential implications for the pricing of information 
asymmetry. First, in a Kyle (1985) type model, competition reduces the need for 
market makers to price protect because it lowers the extent to which information 
asymmetry is exploited. Second, in an Easley and O’Hara (2004) type model, 
competition reduces the risk of information asymmetry to uninformed investors 
because the collective trades by informed investors lead to greater information 
being reflected in the equilibrium price. Hence, when facing higher threat, the 
managers would benefit even further by inquiring about their stock price 
movements since they contain even more information as competition increases. 
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                                                             CHAPTER 2 
Review of Literature 
There are many notable differences between the fields of finance and 
macroeconomics. One of their salient differences is their perspective of the stock 
market. Finance scholars consider the stock market as the most important market 
which affects corporate investment decisions, whereas macroeconomists give a 
minor role to the stock market when it comes to making investment decisions. In 
fact, it has been established that the stock market is a predictor of the business 
cycle and provided that the stock market is well-functioning and rational, stock 
price movements can be deemed as a predictor of the business cycle. According to 
Henry (2003) “Changes in stock prices reflect both revised expectations about 
future corporate earnings and changes in the discount rate at which these expected 
earnings are capitalized”. As a result, stock prices seem to possess a forward-
looking property which renders the stock market a plausible predictor of the 
business cycle. If in addition the information contained in stock prices is deemed 
of high quality, then stock price movements would produce concise and reliable 
predictions 
Notwithstanding the stock market has been recognized as a predictor of 
the business cycle in theory, macroeconomic forecasters have been reluctant to 
give importance to its predictions. According to Moore (1983), the stock market 
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receives rather modest attention compared with other indicators such as interest 
rate and money supply changes which are frequently showcased for their business 
cycle predictive ability by macroeconomists.  Moore goes on to show that during 
the period of 1873 to 1975, the stock market had led the business cycle at eighteen 
of twenty peaks and at seventeen of twenty three troughs. 
The contribution of the financial sector to the economy has become 
increasingly pervasive in the past two decades. Going all the way back to 
Schumpeter (1911), the financial literature abounds with articles that show that a 
well-functioning financial system contributes positively to a country’s economic 
growth. To cite a few, King and Levine (1993), Levine and Zervos (1998), and 
Rajan and Zingales (1997) link capital markets and economic growth and all 
argue that a more developed financial sector leads to economic growth. Merton 
and Bodie (1995) argue that the main role of a financial sector is to allocate 
economic resources in a risky environment. This role has been further subdivided 
by Levine (2005) into five categories: First to transmit information about possible 
investments and capital allocation, second to monitor investments and exert 
corporate control, third to facilitate diversification and management of 
uncertainty, fourth to mobilize and pool savings, and fifth to facilitate the 
exchange of goods and services. This dissertation is mainly concerned with the 
first role of financial markets (its informative role) and in particular how the 
information in the stock price movements is channeled which in turn reflects the 
efficiency of the financial markets.  
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The concept of market efficiency is paramount to financial economics. 
The term efficiency is utilized to refer to a market in which relevant information 
is incorporated into the price of financial assets which is also referred to as the 
informational efficiency of financial markets. The efficient market hypothesis 
(EMH) was developed independently by Samuelson and Fama in the 1960s and 
gives us a substantial insight into the process of determining the price of an asset 
in the marketplace through the interactions of buyers and sellers. EMH has 
triggered a series of empirical tests and critiques; chief among them comes from 
behaviorists who show skepticism regarding the human rationality assumption.   
 Bachelier (1900) in his doctoral Mathematics dissertation at the Sorbonne 
stated that “past, present and even discounted future events are reflected in market 
price” and concluded that asset prices fluctuate randomly. Haplessly, Bachelier’s 
insight was overlooked for more than half a century until it was circulated to 
economists by Paul Samuelson in the late 1950s and then translated to English by 
Cootner in 1964.  
The EMH was originally formulated independently in the 1960s by 
Eugene Fama and Paul Samuelson. In 1965, Paul Samuelson wrote an article 
whose article is ‘Proof that Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly’. He 
argues that in a market that is informationally efficient, price changes must be 
unpredictable if they fully reflect the information and expectations of all market 
participants. In other words, Samuelson argues that “There is no way of making 
an expected profit by extrapolating past changes in the future price, by chart or 
any other esoteric devices of magic or mathematics”.  Fama (1963; 1965a; 1965b, 
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1970) introduced in his seminal papers the concept of market efficiency and states 
that a market in which prices at any time “fully reflect available information is 
called efficient”. His research stems primarily from his interest in the statistical 
properties of stock prices and the ongoing debate between technical and 
fundamental analyses. In 1978, Jensen wrote “I believe there is no other 
proposition in economics which has more solid empirical evidence supporting it 
than the Efficient Market Hypothesis”. Lucas (1978) adds that in markets where 
all investors have ‘rational expectations’, prices do fully reflect all available 
information and marginal-utility weighted prices follow martingales. There were 
several extensions of the EMH including the consideration of non-traded assets 
such as human capital, non-homogeneous expectations, asymmetric information, 
taxes, transactions costs, and various other forms of extensions.  However the 
general ides is the same: investors are rational, markets are efficient when it 
comes to gathering information, and equilibrium prices reflect all relevant 
information. (Lo 2007) 
A substantial portion of the financial sector’s activity transpires in the 
secondary market. Secondary financial markets play a major role in linking 
borrowers and savers of capital and serve as a venue where their exchanges take 
place. The allocation of capital is a primary role of capital markets and the 
investment policy of firms is a major element of the allocation process. But does 
the stock market provide information to its participants or is it merely a sideshow? 
This question has become particularly pertinent after the recent financial crisis. 
One salient feature of a financial market is that a great part of its activity takes 
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places in secondary financial markets where instruments are traded among market 
participants without the firm’s involvement. What transpires in the stock markets 
is daily reported by the press and media and is constantly tracked by managers. 
Can this be a signal that stock prices inherently contain information of interest to 
the market participants including firm managers which ultimately might impact 
the real economic activity? One could answer this question by simply arguing that 
one way of testing this question is to investigate whether stock prices affect a firm 
decision maker’s actions.  Hayek (1945) wrote “We must look at the price system 
as such a mechanism for communicating information if we want to understand its 
real function…The most significant fact about this system is the economy of 
knowledge with which it operates, or how little the individual participants need to 
know in order to be able to take the right action”. He further argues that prices are 
a useful source of information and that financial market is a venue where many 
speculators with different pieces of information meet to trade, trying to capitalize 
on their information. Stock prices gather this myriad of pieces of information and 
present an accurate assessment of firm value which will be used by managers in 
order to guide their decisions. In other words, stock prices enable managers to 
utilize those diverse pieces of information from different traders who have no 
other means of communicating with managers outside the trading process. 
Baumol (1965) argues that firm managers will learn from this information and 
utilize it to guide their decisions which will affect firm cash flows and values. 
Consequently, the financial market has a real effect on the economy by conveying 
information from investors to managers. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen 
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and Meckling (1976) argue that stock prices can be utilized as a monitoring tool. 
They reason that a firm’s stock prices movements reflect the managers’ decisions. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that “the existence of a well-organized market 
in which corporate claims are continuously assessed is perhaps the single most 
important control mechanism affecting managerial behavior in modem industrial 
economies”.  Fama (1976) wrote “if the capital market is to function smoothly in 
allocating resources, prices of securities must be good indicators of value”. Tobin 
(1969) shows that the stock price of a firm can be utilized by a manager in order 
to make optimal investment decisions. He relates investment to q, which is the 
ratio of the market’s valuation of capital to the cost of acquiring new capital. An 
increase in the prospective return on capital or a decrease in the market’s discount 
rate raises q and thereby increases investment. With a simple form of adjustment 
cost for changing the capital stock, the optimal amount of current investment 
depends only on the current value of q.  
Resorting to the stock prices in order to make corporate decisions hinges 
on the assumption that the capital markets are efficient. According to Fama and 
Miller (1972) “An efficient market has a very desirable feature. In particular, at 
any point in time market prices of securities provide accurate signals for resource 
allocation; that is, firms can make production-investment decisions, and 
consumers can choose among the securities that represent ownership of firms’ 
activities under the presumption that security prices at any time “fully reflect” all 
available information. A market in which prices fully reflect available information 
is called efficient.”  
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In a capitalist world, prices are used to balance supply and demand for 
goods and services and price changes serve to redeploy resources in the most 
efficient way possible. Secondary market prices are often perceived as the most 
“informationally efficient” prices in the economy (Dow and Gorton (1997). The 
market is interested in learning about managers’ decisions but the manager may 
also want to glean into stock prices in order to gauge how to market reacts to 
prospective investments. Stock prices may be used by managers since it conveys 
information about prospective investment projects and cash flows. In other words, 
information in stock prices will be utilized by managers in order to make 
investment decisions since managers will be compensated based on subsequent 
stock price information. In sum, stock prices indirectly affect managerial 
investment decisions by imparting two sorts of information: one pertains to 
investment opportunities and refers to the “prospective” role of stock market 
prices and the other reflects managers’ past decisions and choices and refers to the 
“retrospective” role of stock market prices. Thus, the capital market has both an 
informative and monitoring role. Dow and Gorton (1997) further argue that 
shareholders want managers to learn from the information contained in stock 
prices and intend to induce them to act this way. Along the same line, Boot and 
Thakor (1997) and Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) use the feedback effect to 
rationalize a firm’s choice to issue publicly traded securities, rather than receiving 
private financing (e.g., from a bank). In these models, public trading allows the 
firm to infer information from its stock price and use it to improve its real 
decisions. They show that managers can improve their investment decisions by 
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observing stock-price movements because stock prices contain information that is 
aggregated from investors who do not communicate directly with firms. Foucault 
and Gehrig (2008) extend this reasoning to explain the decision of a firm to cross-
list shares in two different markets: Cross-listing enables the firm to obtain more 
precise information from the stock market and improve the efficiency of its 
investment decisions. 
But one could pose the following question: How could outside investors 
be more informed than the managers of the firm themselves?  According to 
Grossman (1976) and Hellwig (1980), even though an individual investor may be 
less informed than the manager, the stock market price reflects the information of 
a collection of investors who on aggregate may be more informed. Furthermore, 
managerial decisions do not rely on internal information solely related to the firm, 
but also on information related to the economic environment, the industry 
outlook, the firm’s competitive position competition among other external sources 
of information. In fact, Allen (1993) contends that financial markets have become 
more informative as production processes have become more convoluted. 
Furthermore, Jegadeesh, Weinstein, and Welch (1993) and Michaely and Shaw 
(1994) found that outsiders know more than insiders about the value of the firm 
when it comes to initial public offering (IPO) issuance. Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (MSV hereafter) (1990) argue that the debates over market efficiency 
would not be as lively as they are if the stock market did not impact real economic 
activity.  MSV (1990) were the first to formally categorize the possible cases of 
informativeness of the stock market and its interaction with firms’ decision 
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makers. They introduced four distinct hypotheses related to the informative role 
of financial markets. The first theory states that the stock market is merely a 
sideshow and does not play any role in affecting managers’ investment decisions. 
The second theory states that managers rely on the stock market as a source of 
information when they make investment decisions but that information may or 
may not be accurate in determining the firm’s prospects. The third theory and 
most probably the most common view of the stock market role states that the 
stock market affects managers’ investment through its influence on the cost of 
funds and external financing. Finally, the fourth theory states that the stock 
market affects managers’ decisions not because of its informational and financing 
role but rather due to the fact that managers must adhere to investors' preferences 
in order to protect their livelihood.  
In relation to our empirical analysis, MSV defined the “passive informant” 
hypothesis which argues that the stock market is merely a sideshow and does not 
play any important role in allocating investment funds. It says that the firm’s 
decision makers know more than the public about the investment opportunities 
facing the firm. The market might reflect what market participants think about the 
firm's investments, but that does not influence managers’ decisions. This view 
portrays the stock market as a sideshow where firm managers do not learn 
anything from the stock price. The passive informant hypothesis has gained great 
support since it makes sense to reason that outsiders know less about the firm than 
insiders. The passive informant hypothesis draws support from the literature on 
insider trading. Seyhun (1986) shows that insiders make money on trading in their 
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firms' stock and that they successfully predict their firm’s future return which 
suggests that insiders’ knowledge helps them with forecasting their firm’s return.  
Their “accurate active informant” hypothesis states that “the stock market 
plays a bigger role and that stock prices affect a firm’s investment because they 
convey to managers information which facilitates their decision making process. 
It argues that security price influence managers’ real decisions because some 
investors trade on private information not available to managers, who therefore 
rely on stock prices as a source of information. Therefore, according to the active 
informant hypothesis the stock market is not merely a sideshow but rather plays a 
greater role in the managerial decision process. MSV further argue that even if the 
stock market might send inaccurate signal, the information may still be used and 
so the stock return will influence investment. Their “faulty active informant” 
argues that managers’ decisions about investment are influenced by stock price 
movements, but managers cannot distinguish between movements reflecting 
fundamentals and those pertaining to market sentiment.”  
Corporate managers usually make three vital decisions namely, investment 
decisions, payout decisions, and financing decisions. Managers undertake 
investments in the sole purpose of ameliorating the future value of the firm. Since 
we know that share prices are forward looking and incorporate the information 
pertaining to the expected value of the firm, one would expect that investment and 
stock prices to be linked. The financial literature abounds with scholar articles 
that find a positive relationship between a firm’s investment and stock returns. 
However, there is no absolute consensus that the mentioned relationship is always 
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positive. Some scholars argue that the link between capital expenditure and stock 
return often hinge upon the characteristics of the firm in consideration. According 
to Naran Bhana (2008) “The market responds significantly and positively to 
capital announcements by focused firms, whereas there is a much weaker 
response to announcements by diversified companies”. Chung, Wright, and 
Charoenwong (1998) argue that the share price reaction to a company’s capital 
expenditures depends on how that market perceives that specific investment. 
Some scholars also put forward the argument that stock markets are not always 
efficient in processing information and may not always reflect the real expected 
value of the firm. As a result, relying on the stock market prices to make 
investment decisions might not always be sensible. In fact Bosworth (1975) states 
that is incomprehensible that managers would base their investment decisions on 
a very volatile short-lived changes in stock prices. Anderson and Garcia-Feijoo 
(2002) examine the relationship between capital investment, growth options, and 
stock returns. They find that stock returns are negatively linked to firm-level 
investment. More specifically, they find that subsequent monthly returns are 
significantly lower for firms that have recently accelerated investment spending. 
On the other hand, there is a vast line of literature which finds that there is 
appositive relationship between corporate investments and stock market return. 
McConnell and Muscarella (1985) study the market reaction to capital 
expenditure decisions by industrial and public utility firms. They find they when 
firms announce an increase in capital expenditures it’s reflected by a positive 
stock return for industrial firms. They also find that when the firms announce a 
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decrease in capital expenditure it’s reflected by a negative stock return for those 
firms. Tease (1993) went a step further and decomposed the stock price into 
speculative and fundamental components and argued that the speculative part 
does not influence investment decisions. Blanchard, Rhee and Summers (1990) 
and Chirinko and Schaller (1996) also support the idea that the inefficiencies of 
the stock market seem not to impact investment.  
Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) argue that stock prices usually respond 
positively to major corporate investment. However, financing originating from 
increased investment (issuing equity for instance) leads to a negative stock return 
(Loughran and Ritter (1995)). They further argue that corporate decisions related 
to decreased investment (repurchases for instance) usually results in positive stock 
returns. They also find that firms that increase their investment expenditures they 
mainly tend to underperform their benchmarks over the following five years. 
Titman, Wei, Xie present an explanation as to why stock returns might react 
negatively to an increase in investment. They reason that it might be due to the 
fact the managers usually attempt to justify their investment by embellishing their 
new business opportunities. However, if the investors do not appreciate those new 
ventures instigated by the managers, it could be reflected negatively on the stock 
return. This phenomenon, they argue, could be even more accentuated for 
managers deemed to be empire builders. In sum, Titman, Wei, and Xie document 
a negative relationship between capital investment and future stock returns.  
Some authors introduced theoretical models relating corporate investment and 
stock return. For instance, Cochrane (1991, 1996) introduces an asset pricing 
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model based on aggregate capital investment and shows that it fares as well as the 
Capital asset pricing model and the Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986) model.  
There is also ample evidence that there is a positive relationship between a 
firm’s R&D and stock return (Chan, Martin, and Kensinger 1990; Chan, 
Lakonishok, and Sougiannis 2001; Chambers, Jennings, and Thompson 2002; 
Chu 2007; Lin 2007; Li and Liu 2010)). Chan, Martin and Kensinger (1990) 
found that that there is a positive significant stock market reaction to the 
announcements of increased R&D expenditures by US firms. Nonetheless, the 
reaction was found to be negative when it comes to low technology firms, which 
indicates that the stock market is able to differentiate between good and bad 
investments and ultimately rewards firms undertaking sensible investments. Li 
(2011) examines the link between financial constrained firms, R&D investments, 
and stock returns. He finds that R&D predicts returns only among financially 
constrained firms. In other words, there is a strong interaction effect between 
financial constraints, R&D investment, and stock expected returns.  
Woolridge and Snow (1990) analyzed the market reaction to different 
types of investment announcements. They categorized them as joint ventures, 
R&D, capital expenditure, and product market diversification. They found that 
there is a positive reaction to each category of investment. They further examined 
whether the size of the project and its longevity affect that relationship between 
investment and stock returns. They find that the market does not differentiate 
between large and small projects, and between long- and short- term projects. 
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Jennings and Mazzeo (1991) analyze the relation between a firm’s stock 
returns at the announcement of an acquisition and management's subsequent 
actions. They find that managers’ use of market information depends mainly on 
the private information they possess. Stephens and Weisbach (1998) find that 
managers rely on their firm’s stock performance to determine the number of 
shares they decide to repurchase. Subrahmanyam and Titman (2001) contend that 
a company's stock price impacts how the firm is perceived by its customers, 
suppliers, employees, lenders, and other stakeholders. Moreover, the way the firm 
is perceived affects their purchase, supply, or investment decisions, which 
eventually affect the firm's cash flow. Recent studies lend support to this direct 
feedback from asset prices to asset cash flows. 
Accrding to Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) “corporate investment is 
sensitive to nonfundamental movements in stock prices”. They assert that 
corporate investment and the stock market are positively correlated in both time 
series and cross-sectional analysis. They reason that the reason behind that 
positive relation is the fact the stock prices reflect the marginal product. They 
further specify that that reasoning is mainly based on the relationship between 
investment and Tobin’s Q introduced first by Tobin (1969) and later by 
Furstenberg (1977). Sunder (2005) provides evidence that financing costs of firms 
are affected by information spillovers from stock markets and shows that the 
firms’ bank borrowing costs are decreasing in measures of information production 
in stock markets.  In particular, Sunder’s paper investigates the value if a firm 
based on the information spillovers from its publicly traded stock. The concept of 
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“Information spillover” was first explored by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) who 
showed that information produced by informed investors could be communicated 
to uninformed though stock prices. Along the same line, Allen and Gale (2000) 
state that stock prices play a significant role in aggregating formation. They 
contend that when there is uncertainty regarding the optimal action to be taken by 
firms, financial markets serve as a mechanism for aggregating dispersed beliefs. 
Aghion, Bolton and Tirole (2000) have examined the interaction between the 
existence of an informative stock price and the incentives of the initial equity 
investor to monitor. They found that having an informative stock price improves 
monitoring incentives. Polk and Sapienza (2009) test how stock market 
mispricing might influence individual firms’ investment decisions. They find that 
a firm’s investment decision is related to the market mis-valuation of the firm. 
More specifically, they find that a typical change in their mispricing proxy 
triggers about a two percent change in the company’s investment. They further 
show that the greater the degree of asymmetric information between firms and 
investors, the more sensitive the firm’s investment decisions are sensitive to the 
stock market mispricing. 
Dye and Srydar (2002) state that capital market participants in aggregate 
may have information pertaining to the firm unknown to the managers of the firm. 
They examine whether managers utilize the capital market’s information in order 
to make or alter their managerial strategies. They show that managers are able to 
extract information from the stock market by first making a new strategy available 
to the public and then observe the market reaction to the announcement of that 
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strategy. They further show that stock market prices can be used to direct 
managers’ decisions. They further reason that information flows from the stock 
market to firms because first of all prices in stock markets, like all prices, impact 
resource allocation decisions. Second, stock market participants are experts in 
valuation and their success hinges on their accuracy to estimate firms’ future 
decisions. Thus, they conclude that capital markets should therefore possess 
information not available to managers.  
Burton and Seale (2005) delineate the use of market data to monitor 
insured institutions’ risk. They quote Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., Vice Chairman, 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System who said “Our examiners are 
extremely good at what they do, but any good examiner recognizes that data 
should come from a variety of different sources, including the signals that come 
from the market.  Therefore, market discipline can be an important adjunct to the 
supervisory process”. 
Luo (2005) analyzes 200 mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the US in 
the 1990s and finds that merging firms appear to learn from the market during the 
M&A process by observing how the market reacts to the merger announcement. 
His study shows that the information contained in stock prices enhances 
managers’ information sets and affects their forward-looking disclosures. It also 
supports the fact that information flows between firms and capital markets. 
Chen, Goldstein & Jiang (2007) state that “two measures of the amount of 
private information in stock price—price nonsynchronicity and probability of 
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informed trading (PIN)—have a strong positive effect on the sensitivity of 
corporate investment to stock price. Moreover, the effect is robust to the inclusion 
of controls for managerial information and for other information-related variables. 
The results suggest that firm managers learn from the private information in stock 
price about their own firms’ fundamentals and incorporate this information in the 
corporate investment decisions”. We relate our findings to an alternative 
explanation for the investment-to-price sensitivity, namely that it is generated by 
capital constraints, and show that both the learning channel and the alternative 
channel contribute to this sensitivity.  
Behaviorists link competition and behavioral consequences. Going all the 
way back to Triplett (1898) who documented a link between competition and task 
performance and that rivalry is a powerful psychological phenomenon with 
substantial behavioral consequences Kilduff, Elfenbein, and Staw (2010) state 
that “they believe that rivalry may have a range of important consequences for the 
attitudes, decisions, and behaviors of competitors.  A number of studies have 
linked competition to enhanced motivation (Mulvey and Ribbens (1999) and 
Tauer and Harackiewicz (2004)) and task performance (Erev et al. (1993), Brown 
et al. (1998), and Tauer amd Harackiewicz (2004))”. 
The way decision makers perceive their market environment (their 
competitors) and the firm’s prospective delineate their corporate strategy which in 
turn affects the performance of the firm and the market in which it operates. The 
relations between the firm and its market environment lie at the intersection 
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between the field of industrial organization which is a branch of economics and 
the field of organizational behavior and administration. (Caves) 
Going all the way back to Smith (1776) who stated that “Monoply is a 
great enemy to good management”, scholars such as Alchian (1950) and Stigler 
(1958) have argued that competition in the product market is a powerful 
mechanism ensuring that management does not waste corporate resources. 
There is a growing literature which examines the relationship between 
product market competition, managerial incentives alignment, and efficiency. 
Caves and Barton (1990) and Caves (1992) find that above a certain level of 
industry concentration, technical efficiency is reduced. Nickell, Nicolitsas and 
Dryden (1997) observe that UK firms that face more competition also face higher 
levels of productivity growth. Raith (2003) shows that stronger competition 
implies better alignment of manager’s incentives. Fabrizio et al. (2010) find that 
the utilities deregulation in the U.S. has made utilities firms more productive. 
Economists argue that managers of firms in competitive industries have 
strong incentives to reduce slack and maximize profits (Giroud and Mueller 
(2010)). The empirical literature concludes that competition induces better 
corporate governance which in turn aligns managers’ and shareholders’ interests. 
In fact, the “quiet life” hypothesis which was originally formulated by Sir John 
Hick in 1935 argues that managers in non-competitive industries tend to enjoy a 
quiet life which can lead to managerial slack, while managers in competitive 
industries are constantly under pressure and are prone to improve efficiency. As 
 36 
 
Sir John Hicks put it “the best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life”. Hart (1983) 
shows that competition mitigates managerial slack. Holmstrom (1982) and 
Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) demonstrate that an increase in the number of 
competitors may provide additional information that can be used to mitigate 
moral hazard. Schmidt (1997) shows that competition increases the probability 
that a firm with high costs becomes unprofitable and must be liquidated, which 
induces managers to work hard in order to keep their jobs and avoid the likelihood 
of liquidation.  Allen and Gale (2000) argue that product market competition 
provides corporate managers with incentives to behave efficiently because 
competition forces out incompetent managers. They go even further and contend 
that product market competition may be a more effective corporate governance 
mechanism than either the market for corporate control or monitoring by 
institutions. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and Giroud and Mueller (2010) 
find evidence supporting the predictions of the “quiet life” hypothesis, namely 
that managers in concentrated industries avoid difficult tasks such as firing 
employees, negotiating with employees over salaries, or negotiating with 
suppliers over prices of inputs. Chhaochharia, Grinstein, Grullon, Michaely 
(2012) attain results that reinforce the “quiet life” hypothesis in that managers in 
concentrated industries decrease slack more than managers in non-concentrated 
industries. 
It has been documented that the efficiency of corporate investments is 
influenced by problems of asymmetric information and agency. By inquiring 
about their own stock price movements and the one of their peers, managers 
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might mitigate the asymmetric information and hence improve their investment 
efficiency.  Stein in his 2009 JF presidential address states there might be a link 
between competition and the financial market efficiency. In fact, there is a 
growing literature which examines the relationship between product market 
competition, managerial incentives alignment, and efficiency. Caves and Barton 
(1990) and Caves (1992) find that above a certain level of industry concentration, 
technical efficiency is reduced. Nickell, Nicolitsas and Dryden (1997) observe 
that UK firms that face more competition also face higher levels of productivity 
growth. Raith (2003) shows that stronger competition implies better alignment of 
manager’s incentives. Fabrizio et al. (2010) find that the utilities deregulation in 
the U.S. has made utilities firms more productive. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
note that “product market competition is probably the most powerful force 
towards economic efficiency in the world". Schmidt (1997) shows that 
competition increases the probability that a firm with high costs becomes 
unprofitable and must be liquidated, which induces managers to work hard in 
order to keep their jobs and avoid the likelihood of liquidation. Hart (1983) shows 
that competition mitigates managerial slack. Holmstrom (1982) and Nalebuff and 
Stiglitz (1983) demonstrate that an increase in the number of competitors may 
provide additional information that can be used to mitigate moral hazard. Allen 
and Gale (2000) argue that product market competition provides corporate 
managers with incentives to behave efficiently because competition forces out 
incompetent managers. 
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Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and Giroud and Mueller (2010) find 
evidence supporting the predictions of the “quiet life” hypothesis, namely that 
managers in concentrated industries avoid difficult tasks such as firing employees, 
negotiating with employees over salaries, or negotiating with suppliers over prices 
of inputs. Chaocharia, Grinstein, Grullon, Michaely (2012) attain results that 
reinforce the “quiet life” hypothesis in that managers in concentrated industries 
decrease slack more than managers in non-concentrated industries. Thus, 
competition would further enhance the active informant hypothesis. Managers’ 
efficiency and refraining from slack could be interpreted as paying more attention 
to information possessed by sophisticated investors who might have some 
information that managers do not possess. This could be done by gleaning over 
their stock price movements and the one of their peers, since stock price have 
been proved to contain residual information that managers might not have. 
 
 Griffith (2001) shows that product market competition results in a better 
productivity, especially among those firms in which managers have conflicts of 
interest. Giroud and mueller (2012) investigate the interaction between product 
market competition and firms’ payout policy. They find that firms in more 
competitive industries pay more dividends than firms in less competitive 
industries. Their empirical findings reinforce the idea that product market 
competition pushes managers to pay out excess cash and therefore induces 
managers to behave in a more efficient manner. Bloom, Propper, Seiler, and Van 
Reenan (2010) investigate the relationship of competition on management quality, 
and find that competition in an effective way of improving management. 
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Stoughton, Wong, Li (2013) provide a series of empirical tests in order to 
investigate the relationship between competition and investment efficiency. Their 
findings lend support to the notion that shows that investment is more efficient in 
concentrated industries. 
Dougal, Parsons, and Titman (2012) show that a company’s investment is 
highly sensitive to the investments of other companies located nearby. They 
further show that even after controlling for its own Q and cash flows, a 
company’s investment is strongly related to the Q and cash flows of nearby firms 
operating outside its industry. The authors state that “these time-varying regional 
effects are large and indicate that local agglomeration economies are important 
determinants of firm investment and growth”. In sum, Dougal et al. (2012) find 
that investment expenditures depend on the geographic location of the firm and its 
proximity to peer firms and even firms operating in different industries. Fracassi 
(2011) investigates the relationship between a firm managers’ professional 
network and its corresponding managerial decisions. He states that “Social 
network theory suggests that individual’s preferences and decisions are affected 
by the actions of others”. He finds that the more social connections two firms 
have in common, the more similar is their level of investment. Gilbert and 
Lieberman (1987) show that firm’s take preemptive actions in order to counter the 
competitions from rivals and maintain market share. Their analysis further 
indicates that investment reduces the likelihood that competitors will increase 
their market share. 
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Predation risk is defined as the risk a firm faces from the actions of its 
rivals. It has been shown that predation risk in the product market can affect a 
firm’s financial decisions significantly. Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) argue 
that predation risk is linked to the interaction of a company’s investment 
opportunities with that of its competitors. Several recent papers study how 
product market competition affects a firm’s financial policy.  Recent empirical 
studies find that higher predatory threats lead to higher level of cash holdings, 
lower dividend payments, and more hedging Haushalter, Klasa, Maxwell (2007) 
investigate whether a firm facing higher competition (or a predation risk) from its 
rivals faces a risk of incurring losses in market share and whether the firm 
manages that specific risk. They find that the firm’s investment opportunities are 
dependent on the level of competition it faces from its peers. Thus, they show that 
predation risk in an important factor which affects a firm’s investment choices. 
Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2013) were able to come up with a new measure 
coined “fluidity” which reflects the similarity between a firm’s product 
characteristics and the product market threat it faces from its rivals. They 
investigate the relationship between product market threats and a firm’s payout 
policy and cash holdings. They find that the higher fluidity or the threat a firm 
faces, the lower the likelihood that a firm pays dividends and repurchase shares. 
They also find that the product market threat is accompanied by a firm’s increase 
in cash holding. Leary and Roberts (2010) show that firms do not make financing 
decisions in isolation. They argue that firms makes financing decisions mainly in 
response to the financing decisions of competitors. They further find that smaller 
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and less successful firms tend to change their financing decisions in response to 
larger and more successful rivals. Fresard and Foucault (2012) show that there is a 
link between a firm’s investment and the stock price of its peers. More 
specifically, they document that a firm’s investment is positively related to the 
stock prices of peer firms that sell related products. They provide evidence that 
this connection arises because managers can learn information from observing the 
stock price of their peers. In Sum, their results prove that financial markets affect 
firm’s managerial decisions by imparting important to the decision makers by 
conveying information contained in the stock market price movements of their 
peers. Fresard and Valta (2013) examine the effect of trade globalization and 
competition on U.S. firms’ investments. The find that when firms face more 
competition they tend to pursue more conservative investment choices. More 
specifically, those firms tend to reduce capital and R&D expenditures and 
increase their cash holding. Ferreira, Ferreira, and Raposo (2008) investigate the 
relationship between board structure and price informativeness. They find a 
negative relationship between price informativeness and board independence. 
They use the probability of informed trading (PIN) as a measure of stock price 
informativeness. Their results reinforce the idea that stock price information and 
board monitoring can substitute each other. 
   According to Fresard (2010), “several studies document that corporate 
decisions are materially affected by the informational content of security prices. 
In particular, Durnev, Morck and Yeung (2004) show that firms invest more 
efficiently when their stock price incorporates a larger amount of private 
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information. Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) report that corporate investment is 
more sensitive to stock price when prices are more informative. They interpret 
this result as evidence that managers extract valuable information from observing 
their stock price, and use this information when deciding on corporate 
investment”. In this paper, we push the logic a step further and include the 
element of threat in order to categorize firms in terms of the level of threat they 
face from their peers.  
Going all the way back to Triplett (1898), many scholars have documented 
a link between competition and task performance and that rivalry is a powerful 
psychological phenomenon with substantial behavioral consequences. Kilduff, 
Elfenbein, and Staw (2010) state that “they believe that rivalry may have a range 
of important consequences for the attitudes, decisions, and behaviors of 
competitors.  A number of studies have linked competition to enhanced 
motivation (Mulvey and Ribbens (1999) and Tauer and Harackiewicz (2004)) and 
task performance (Erev et al. (1993), Brown et al. (1998), and Tauer amd 
Harackiewicz (2004))”. Product market competition makes managers work more 
efficiently. Hart (1983) shows that competition mitigates managerial slack. 
Holmstrom (1982) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) demonstrate that an increase 
in the number of competitors may provide additional information that can be used 
to mitigate moral hazard. Allen and Gale (2000) argue that product market 
competition provides corporate managers with incentives to behave efficiently 
because competition forces out incompetent manager. 
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We rationalize that managers of a firm facing a higher product market 
threat from its peers should learn even more from their corresponding firm’s stock 
price movement s compared with less threatened firms. The logic is quite simple: 
a manager of a firm facing a threat recognizes that his/her company is facing a 
fierce competition and is desperately looking for information from investors in 
order to mitigate the threat. One way of mitigating the threat is by looking for 
additional information pertaining to his/her firm in order to make more sensible 
managerial decisions. Given the fact the competition induces managers to work 
more efficiently; it will be reflected n managers gleaning further over their stock 
price movements. According to Atkins (2012), “competition in the equity markets 
is analogous to competition over sales in the product markets (Holden and 
Subrahmanyam 1992). In product markets, firms with monopoly power over 
product sales extract rents from consumers; more competition between firms over 
product sales reduces this exploitation (Samuelson and Nordhaus 2009). In equity 
markets, informed traders with monopoly power over private information extract 
rents by trading against less informed traders (e.g., liquidity traders). More 
competition between informed traders over private information reduces market 
inefficiency”. 
The logic used in the first hypothesis could be extended to the case where 
a manager of a firm learns from the stock price movements of its peers. Hoberg, 
Phillips, and Prabhala (2013) were able to come up with a new measure coined 
“fluidity” which reflects the similarity between a firm’s product characteristics 
and the product market threat it faces from its rivals. They investigate the 
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relationship between product market threats and a firm’s payout policy and cash 
holdings. They find that the higher fluidity or the threat a firm faces, the lower the 
likelihood that a firm pays dividends and repurchase shares. They also find that 
the product market threat is accompanied by a firm’s increase in cash holding. 
They argue that firms makes financing decisions mainly in response to the 
financing decisions of competitors. They further find that smaller and less 
successful firms tend to change their financing decisions in response to larger and 
more successful rivals. In Sum, their results prove that financial markets affect 
firm’s managerial decisions by imparting important to the decision makers by 
conveying information contained in the stock market price movements of their 
peers. Foucault and Fresard (2012) show that there is a link between a firm’s 
investment and the stock price of its peers. More specifically, they document that 
a firm’s investment is positively related to the stock prices of peer firms that sell 
related products. They provide evidence that this connection arises because 
managers can learn information from observing the stock price of their peers. We 
postulate that the link found by Foucault and Fresard (2012) should be more 
pronounced for a firm facing a threat from its peers. In particular, we rationalize 
that a manager of a threatened firm should learn even further from the stock price 
of his/her peers’ stock price movements in order to address the threat faced by 
his/her firm. Leary and Roberts (2010) find that smaller and less successful firms 
are more likely to adjust their capital structures and financial policies in response 
to the actions of their larger, more successful peers.             
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                                                                             CHAPTER 3 
  
Hypotheses Development 
Empirically, several studies document that corporate decisions are 
materially affected by the informational content of security prices. In particular, 
Durnev, Morck and Yeung (2004) show that firms invest more efficiently when 
their stock price incorporates a larger amount of private information. Chen, 
Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) report that corporate investment is more sensitive to 
stock price when prices are more informative. They interpret this result as 
evidence that managers extract valuable information from observing their stock 
price, and use this information when deciding on corporate investment. In this 
paper, we push the logic a step further and include the element of threat in order 
to categorize firms in terms of the level of threat they face from their peers.  
Going all the way back to Triplett (1898), many scholars have documented 
a link between competition and task performance and that rivalry is a powerful 
psychological phenomenon with substantial behavioral consequences. Kilduff, 
Elfenbein, and Staw (2010) state that they “believe that rivalry may have a range 
of important consequences for the attitudes, decisions, and behaviors of 
competitors”. They also add that “ a number of studies have linked competition to 
enhanced motivation (Mulvey and Ribbens (1999) and Tauer and Harackiewicz 
(2004)) and task performance (Erev et al. (1993), Brown et al. (1998), and Tauer 
amd Harackiewicz (2004))”. Product market competition makes managers work 
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more efficiently. Hart (1983) shows that competition mitigates managerial slack. 
Holmstrom (1982) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) demonstrate that an increase 
in the number of competitors may provide additional information that can be used 
to mitigate moral hazard. Allen and Gale (2000) argue that product market 
competition provides corporate managers with incentives to behave efficiently 
because competition forces out incompetent manager. 
We rationalize that managers of a firm facing a higher product market 
threat from its peers should learn even more from their corresponding firm’s stock 
price movement s compared with less threatened firms. The logic is quite simple: 
a manager of a firm facing a threat recognizes that his/her company is facing a 
fierce competition and is desperately looking for information from investors in 
order to mitigate the threat. One way of mitigating the threat is by looking for 
additional information pertaining to his/her firm in order to make more sensible 
managerial decisions. Given the fact the competition induces managers to work 
more efficiently; it will be reflected n managers gleaning further over their stock 
price movements. This logic leads us to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Managers of firms facing a higher threat from their peers 
are more sensitive to the information in their stock price movements compared to 
less threatened firms. 
The logic used in the first hypothesis could be extended to the case where 
a manager of a firm learns from the stock price movements of its peers. Hoberg, 
Phillips, and Prabhala (2013) were able to come up with a new measure coined 
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“fluidity” which reflects the similarity between a firm’s product characteristics 
and the product market threat it faces from its rivals. They investigate the 
relationship between product market threats and a firm’s payout policy and cash 
holdings. They find that the higher fluidity or the threat a firm faces, the lower the 
likelihood that a firm pays dividends and repurchase shares. They also find that 
the product market threat is accompanied by a firm’s increase in cash holding. 
They argue that firms makes financing decisions mainly in response to the 
financing decisions of competitors. They further find that smaller and less 
successful firms tend to change their financing decisions in response to larger and 
more successful rivals. In Sum, their results prove that financial markets affect 
firm’s managerial decisions by imparting important to the decision makers by 
conveying information contained in the stock market price movements of their 
peers. Foucault and Fresard (2012) show that there is a link between a firm’s 
investment and the stock price of its peers. More specifically, they document that 
a firm’s investment is positively related to the stock prices of peer firms that sell 
related products. They provide evidence that this connection arises because 
managers can learn information from observing the stock price of their peers. We 
postulate that the link found by Foucault and Fresard (2012) should be more 
pronounced for a firm facing a threat from its peers. In particular, we rationalize 
that a manager of a threatened firm should learn even further from the stock price 
of his/her peers’ stock price movements in order to address the threat faced by 
his/her firm. Hence, the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 2: Managers of firms facing a higher threat from their peers 
are more sensitive to the information contained in their peers’ stock price 
compared to less threatened firms 
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                                                       CHAPTER 4                                         
DATA 
 
Text-based Network Industry Classification (TNIC) Data 
To define a firm’s peers, I use the new Text-based Network Industry 
Classification (TNIC) developed by Hoberg and Phillips (2010). According to the 
authors, “this classification is based on text-based analysis of product descriptions 
from firms’10-K statements filed yearly with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). They define as peers all the firms that belong to the same 
TNIC industry in a given year. Their data covers the 1997 to 2008 period. Hoberg 
and Phillips (2010)’s TNIC industries have three important features. First, unlike 
industries based on the Standard Industry Classification (SIC) or the North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS), they are dynamic as they 
change over time as firms’ products evolve. In particular, when a firm modifies its 
product range, innovate, or enter a new product market, the set of peer firms 
change accordingly. Second, TNIC industries are based on the products that firms 
supply to the market, rather than its production processes as, for instance, is the 
case for NAICS. Third, unlike SIC and NAICS industries, TNIC industries do not 
require relations between firms to be transitive. In fact, as industry members are 
defined relative to each firm in the product space, each firm has its own distinct 
set of similar firms. This provides a richer definition of similarity and product 
market relatedness.” 
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Final Sample 
I obtain Investments and accounting data from the annual Compustat 
industrial files. This data constitutes a sample that covers the period 1996-2008. I 
exclude firm-year observations for which total assets are missing. Stock price and 
return information are from CRSP. After merging the CRSP with the Compustat 
data and after deleting the top and bottom 1% of the regression variables, the 
sample comprises 29,860 firm-years observations. Table 2 describes our samples. 
Panel A presents the TNIC sample from Hoberg and Philips (2012), the Threat 
sample from Hoberg, Philips, and Prabhala (2013), COMPUSTAT sample , 
Adjusted probability of informed trading APIN sample from Duarte and Young 
(2007), and our Final Sample which is obtained by merging all the data sample 
mentioned previously. Panel B presents the descriptive statistics of the main 
variable of our final sample used in our analysis which include the Threat, Q 
(defined as market value of equity plus book value of assets minus book value of 
divided by book value of assets), APIN (the adjusted probability of informed 
trading), and investment INV (defined as Capital expenditure plus R&D scaled by 
beginning-of-year assets). 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of our sample. Panel A presents 
the samples utilized in order to reach our final sample. We start with the text-
based network  industry classifications (TNIC) sample used in Hoberg and Philips  
(2012) which was obtained by using web crawling and text parsing algorithms 
and therefore by constructing a database of word business descriptions from 10-K 
annual listings on the SEC Edgar website from 1996 to 2008. The sample gives us 
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a dynamic list of a firm’s peers during a each year. The TNIC sample is 
constituted of 99,592 firm year observations. The Threat sample is obtained from 
Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2013) and introduces a measure of the product 
market threat faced by firms covering the period 1996-2008.  The Threat sample 
is comprised of 65,535 firm year observations. We merged the two samples by 
PERMNO in order to get our preliminary sample. The COMPUSTAT sample 
covers all the firms contained in our preliminary sample which are covered by 
COMPUSTAT. The APIN sample is obtained from Duarte and Young (2007) and 
presents the adjusted probability of informed trading better captures the 
informational component of probability of informed trading (PIN). The APIN 
sample is comprised of 48,294 firm year observations. Finally, our sample is 
obtained by merging the COMPUSTAT sample with the APIN sample and is 
comprised of 44,716 firm year observations.  Panel B presents the descriptive 
statistics of the main variable of our final sample used in our analysis which 
include the Threat, Q (defined as market value of equity plus book value of assets 
minus book value of divided by book value of assets), APIN (the adjusted 
probability of informed trading), and investment INV (defined as Capital 
expenditure plus R&D scaled by beginning-of-year assets). Then average threat is 
6.9516 with a standard deviation of 3.395 and a maximum of 27.262. Q ratio has 
a mean of 1.9513 with a standard deviation of 1.504 and a maximum value of 
59.126. The adjusted PIN (APIN) has a mean of 0.1393, a standard deviation of 
0.068, and a maximum value of 0.698. Finally, investment (INV) has a mean of 
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0.0626 billion dollars, a standard deviation of 0.196 billion, and a maximum value 
of 6.065 billion. 
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                                                    CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Herfindahl-Index 
Testing our hypothesis requires a proxy for the degree of competition. In 
order to measure the level of threat a firm is facing, we use the widely accepted 
measure of competitiveness, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, which is according 
to Wikipedia is “better known as the Herfindahl index, named after economists 
Orris C. Herfindahl and Albert O. Hirschman. The HHI is a statistical measure of 
concentration which measures the size of firms in relation to the industry. In other 
words, the HHI accounts for the number of firms in a market, as well as 
concentration, by incorporating the relative size (that is, market share) of all firms 
in a market. Following Wikipedia, it is calculated by squaring the market shares 
of all firms in a market and then summing the squares, as follows: 
 
                                                                                                    (1) 
 
 
Where si is the market share of firm i in the market, and N is the number of firms. 
There is also a normalised Herfindahl index. Whereas the Herfindahl index ranges 
from 1/N to one, the normalized Herfindahl index ranges from 0 to 1. It is 
computed as: 
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                                                                 (2) 
where again, N is the number of firms in the market, and H is the usual Herfindahl 
Index, as above.” 
Bayes’ prior 
According to F. J. Anscombe, J.R.S.S., 25 (1962) “There are several 
paradigms for approaching statistical inference, but the two dominant ones are 
frequentist (sometimes called classical or traditional) and Bayesian. The overview 
in the previous chapter covered mainly classical approaches. According to the 
Bayesian paradigm, the unobservable parameters in a statistical model are treated 
as random. When no data are available, a prior distribution is used to quantify our 
knowledge about the parameter. When data are available, we can update our prior 
knowledge using the conditional distribution of parameters, given the data. The 
transition from the prior to the posterior is possible via the Bayes theorem. 
The central piece of Bayes’ rule describes how rational agents update their beliefs 
after receiving new information. Suppose that before the experiment our prior 
distribution describing θ is π(θ). The data are coming from the assumed model 
(likelihood) which depends on the parameter and is denoted by f(x| θ): Bayes 
theorem updates the prior π(θ) to the posterior  by accounting for the data x, 
                               π (θ | x) =     θ π θ  
    
                                 (3) 
 
where m(x) is a normalizing constant, m(x) =      θ π θ  θ 
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Once the data x are knows, θ is the only unknown quantity and the posterior 
distribution π(θ |x)  completely describes the uncertainty. There are two key 
advantages of Bayesian paradigm: (i) once the uncertainty is expressed via the 
probability distribution and the statistical inference can be automated, it follows a 
conceptually simple recipe, and (ii) available prior information is coherently 
incorporated into the statistical model” 
Measure of informed trading (  ) 
In order to test our first hypotheses, I divide our sample into quintiles 
based on the herfindahl index measure.  To examine whether a firm’s managers 
are sensitive to the stock informativeness in its stock, I follow Chen, Goldstein, 
Jiang (2007) and perform the following equation for each fluidity group:  
                                                            (4)                         
 
Where      is firm’s i investment in year t,    and   represent year and firm-fixed 
effects.        is the (normalized) price in our analysis and is measured by firm´s 
Q. It is calculated as the market value of equity (price times shares outstanding 
from CRSP) plus book value of assets minus the book value of equity (Item 6–
Item 60), scaled by book assets, all measured at the end of year  
t - 1.           is a measure of the private information in stock price and is 
obtained by following Roll (1988) as 
                                                
                                                          (5)               
Where     
  are estimated each year from the following regression: 
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                                                                                                (6)              
Where         is the weekly return of firm i in industry j at time t,      is the market 
return at time t, and      is the return of industry j at time t.  
The rationale for using firm-specific return variation is based on a large 
body of literature, both empirical and theoretical. French and Roll (1986) and Roll 
(1988) were the first to show that a significant portion of stock return variation is 
not explained by market movements. On this ground, Roll (1988) argues that 
firm-specific return variation has to be correlated with private information. 
Indeed, stock prices move with the arrival of new information, which gets 
impounded into prices in two ways. The first one occurs through a revaluation of 
prices following the release of public information, e.g. news on macroeconomic 
conditions or earnings announcements. The second is through the trading activity 
of investors who possess private information. 
In order to test our first hypotheses using the threat measure, I divide the 
provided by university of Maryland website and which gives us into quintiles 
based on the measure of fluidity.  To examine whether a firm’s managers are 
sensitive to the stock informativeness in its stock, I follow Chen, Goldstein, Jiang 
(2007) and perform the following equation for each fluidity group:  
                                                             (7)                               
 
Where      is firm’s i investment in year t,    and   represent year and firm-fixed 
effects.        is the (normalized) price in our analysis and is measured by firm´s 
Q. It is calculated as the market value of equity (price times shares outstanding 
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from CRSP) plus book value of assets minus the book value of equity (Item 6–
Item 60), scaled by book assets, all measured at the end of year t - 1.           is 
a measure of the private information in stock price and is obtained by following 
Roll (1988) as 
                                    
                                                                        (8) 
Where     
  are estimated each year from the following regression: 
                                                                                                  (9) 
Where         is the weekly return of firm i in industry j at time t,      is the market 
return at time t, and      is the return of industry j at time t.  
The rationale for using firm-specific return variation is based on a large 
body of literature, both empirical and theoretical. French and Roll (1986) and Roll 
(1988) were the first to show that a significant portion of stock return variation is 
not explained by market movements. On this ground, Roll (1988) argues that 
firm-specific return variation has to be correlated with private information. 
Indeed, stock prices move with the arrival of new information, which gets 
impounded into prices in two ways. The first one occurs through a revaluation of 
prices following the release of public information, e.g. news on macroeconomic 
conditions or earnings announcements. The second is through the trading activity 
of investors who possess private information. 
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Probability of Informed Trading 
We also use the PIN measure developed by Easley, Kiefer, and O.Hara 
(1996) as another proxy for the likelihood of informed trading in a stock. It is 
used in a context related to ours by Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) and Bakke 
and Whited (2010). In our tests, we use an adjusted measure of PIN, developed by 
Duarte and Young (2007), which better captures the informational component of 
PIN. 
 Our regression in equation (1) includes the following control variables: 
1/ASSETSi,t-1, CFi,t, INFOit-1 ,and INFOit-1.CFi,t. We include 1/ASSETSi,t-1 
because both the dependent variable Iit and the regressor Qi,t-1 are scaled by last-
year book assets (ASSETSi,t-1), which could introduce spurious correlation. Cash 
flow CFi,t is included both separately and in interaction with INFOit_1 to 
accommodate the well-documented effect of cash flow on investment [e.g., 
Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988)]. We measure CFit as the sum of net 
income before extraordinary items (Item 18), depreciation and amortization 
expenses (Item 14), and R&D expenses (Item 46), scaled by beginning-of-year 
book assets. 
 In order to test our second hypothesis, I use the sample provided by 
Hoberg and Phillips (2010) to identify a firm’s peers and then divide the sample 
into quintiles following the same method used in testing the first hypothesis. I 
follow Foucault and Fresard (2012) and test empirically the following equation: 
                                                                         (10)       
where the subscripts i and t represent respectively firm I and and the year, while 
the subscript -i represents a (equally-weighted) portfolio of peer firms based on 
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the TNIC industries). The dependent variable      is a measure of corporate 
investment in year t, which in the baseline specification, is the ratio of capital 
expenditure in that year scaled by lagged fixed assets (property, plant and 
equipment). The variable,       , is the normalized stock price of firm i in year t-
1. The variable,         , is the (average) normalized stock price of firm I’s peers, 
computed as the average Q across all the firms included in the same TNIC 
industry as firm i in year t - 1, except firm i.         and         are the control 
variables for firm i and its peers respectively  and comprise cash flow and size of 
the firm and its peers. 
As in the regression in equation (1), we follow other papers Durnev, 
Morck, and Yeung (2004) and Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) in order to 
measure the informativeness of a firm stock price with a measure of firm-specific 
return variation (or price non-synchronicity).To test the model’s predictions, we 
need to measure the effect of on the co-variation between investment and stock 
prices, while holding constant the information pertaining to the firm’s peers (and 
vice versa).  
 
Heckman Correction 
In order to investigate whether our regressions suffer from a sample 
selection bias, we use the Heckman correction which, according to Wikipedia, 
“consists of a two-step statistical approach and offers a means of correcting for 
non-randomly selected samples. Heckman discussed bias from using nonrandom 
selected samples to estimate behavioral relationships as a specification error. He 
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suggests a two-stage estimation method to correct the bias. Heckman’s correction 
involves a normality assumption, provides a test for sample selection bias and 
formula for bias corrected model. 
In the first stage, we formulate a model, based on economic theory, for the 
probability of working.” According to Wikipedia,” the canonical specification for 
this relationship is a probit regression of the form 
                                                                                     (11) 
 
where D indicates employment (D = 1 if the respondent is employed and D = 0 
otherwise), Z is a vector of explanatory variables, is a vector of unknown 
parameters, and Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal 
distribution. Estimation of the model yields results that can be used to predict this 
employment probability for each individual. 
In the second stage, the researcher corrects for self-selection by 
incorporating a transformation of these predicted individual probabilities as an 
additional explanatory variable. The wage equation may be specified, 
                                                                                                                    (12) 
where denotes an underlying wage offer, which is not observed if the 
respondent does not work. The conditional expectation of wages given the person 
works is then 
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                                                 (13) 
Under the assumption that the error terms are jointly normal, we have 
                                                               (14) 
where ρ is the correlation between unobserved determinants of propensity to work 
and unobserved determinants of wage offers u, σ u is the standard deviation of , 
and is the inverse Mills ratio evaluated at . This equation demonstrates 
Heckman's insight that sample selection can be viewed as a form of omitted-
variables bias, as conditional on both X and on it is as if the sample is randomly 
selected. The wage equation can be estimated by replacing with Probit estimates 
from the first stage, constructing the term, and including it as an additional 
explanatory variable in linear regression estimation of the wage equation. Since 
, the coefficient on can only be zero if , so testing the null that 
the coefficient on is zero is equivalent to testing for sample selectivity.” 
Product Market Threat 
Following Hoberg and Fresard In order to test our first hypotheses, I 
divide the sample provided by Hoberg and Phillips (2012)’s into quintiles based 
on the measure of fluidity.  To examine whether a firm’s managers are sensitive 
to the stock informativeness in its stock, I follow Chen, Goldstein, Jiang (2007) 
and perform the following equation for each fluidity group:  
 
                                                                   (15) 
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Where      is firm’s i investment in year t,    and   represent year and firm-fixed 
effects.        is the (normalized) price in our analysis and is measured by firm´s 
Q. It is calculated as the market value of equity (price times shares outstanding 
from CRSP) plus book value of assets minus the book value of equity (Item 6–
Item 60), scaled by book assets, all measured at the end of year t - 1. 
We use the adjusted probability of informed trading APIN developed by 
Duarte and Young (2007) as a proxy for the likelihood of informed trading in a 
stock. It is used in a context related to ours by Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007), 
Bakke and Whited (2010), and Fresard and Foucault (2012).(Please see Appendix 
1 for more details) 
  Our regression in equation (1) includes the following control variables: 
1/ASSETSi,t-1, CFi,t, INFOit-1 ,and INFOit-1.CFi,t. We include 1/ASSETSi,t-1 
because both the dependent variable Iit and the regressor Qi,t-1 are scaled by last-
year book assets (ASSETSi,t-1), which could introduce spurious correlation. Cash 
flow CFi,t is included both separately and in interaction with INFOit_1 to 
accommodate the well-documented effect of cash flow on investment [e.g., 
Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988)]. We measure CFit as the sum of net 
income before extraordinary items (Item 18), depreciation and amortization 
expenses (Item 14), and R&D expenses (Item 46), scaled by beginning-of-year 
book assets. 
 In order to test our second hypothesis, I use the sample provided by 
Hoberg and Phillips (2010) to identify a firm’s peers and then divide the sample 
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into quintiles following the same method used in testing the first hypothesis. I 
follow Foucault and Fresard (2012) and test empirically the following equation: 
                                                                           
(16)      
 
where the subscripts i and t represent respectively firm i and and the year, while 
the subscript -i represents a (equally-weighted) portfolio of peer firms based on 
the TNIC industries). The dependent variable      is a measure of corporate 
investment in year t, which in the baseline specification, is the ratio of capital 
expenditure in that year scaled by lagged fixed assets (property, plant and 
equipment). The variable,         , is the  normalized stock price of firm i’s peers, 
computed as the average Q across all the firms included in the same TNIC 
industry as firm i in year t - 1, except firm i.        is the control variable for firm 
i and comprise cash flow and size of the firm.            is the probability of 
informed trading of firm i’s peer firms. 
As in the regression in equation (1), we follow other papers Durnev, Morck, and 
Yeung (2004) and Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) in order to measure the 
informativeness of a firm stock price with a measure of firm-specific return 
variation (or price non-synchronicity).To test the model’s predictions, we need to 
measure the effect of on the co-variation between investment and stock prices, 
while holding constant the informationpertaining to the firm’s peers (and vice 
versa).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
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Fluidity Measure 
 
The notion that rival threats are important, perhaps even more so than 
static measures of market share, is consistent with theories of contestable markets 
in industrial organization (Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982)). In order to gauge 
the level of threat faced by a firm, I utilize a measure introduced by Philips, 
Hoberg, and Prabhala (2013) coined “Fluidity”. According to the authors, “they 
use computational linguistics to analyze over 42,000 individual firm business 
descriptions from firm 10-Ks to construct new measures of the structure and 
evolution of the product space occupied by firms. These measures include product 
fluidity, a new measure of the competitive threats faced by a firm in its product 
market, which captures changes in rival firms' products relative to the firm. More 
specifically, fluidity captures how rivals are changing the product words that 
overlap with firm i's vocabulary. Fluidity focuses on product space dynamics and 
changes in products. Specifically, let    denote a scalar equal to the number of all 
unique words used in the product descriptions of all firms in year t. Let   denote 
an ordered Boolean vector of length     identifying which of the     words are used 
by firm i in year t. Element j of   equals 1 if firm i uses word j in its product 
description and is zero otherwise. They normalize    to unit length and define 
the result is     . 
To capture the changes in the overall usage of a given word j in year t, 
they define the aggregate vector        as: 
 
 
 
                                                                                       (17) 
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So a firm’s product market fluidity is simply the dot product between its own 
word vector      and normalized       : 
 
                           <      .  
      
        
 >                            (18) 
 
Intuitively, fluidity is a “cosine” similarity between a firm's own word usage      
vector and the aggregate change vector        . Quantitatively, the dot product in 
Eq. (2) measures the cosine of the angle between the two vectors. Because the dot 
product is based on non-negative vectors, fluidity is thus the cosine between 
vectors in the first quadrant. Thus fluidity lies in the interval [0; 1]. Fluidity is 
greater when a firm's words overlap more with       , the vector that reflects rival 
actions. Thus it is larger when there is a greater competitive threat.”   
Probability of Informed Trading (PIN) 
Accrding to Fresard (2010) “The probability of information-based trading 
(PIN) was developed by Easley, Kiefer and O’Hara (1996). This measure is based 
on the estimation of a structural microstructure model, where trades may come 
from “noise traders” or “informed traders”. Je also add that “it has been shown 
empirically that PIN is a valid measure of price informativeness.  Vega (2006) 
reports that stock with high PIN have smaller reactions following an earnings 
announcement, which is in line with the idea that these stocks incorporate more 
private information.” 
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Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2007) and Bakke and Whited (2008) document 
a positive association between PIN and the sensitivity of investment to stock. In 
this dissertation, we use an adjusted measure of PIN (APIN), developed by Duarte 
and Young (2007), which better captures the informational component of PIN. 
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                CHAPTER 6   
                                            
 
FINDINGS 
 
As a prelude to our empirical findings, let’s first make some important 
observations regarding the time series of the Standard and Poors (S&P) and the 
U.S. gross fixed investment. Figure 1 presents the log of the Standard and Poors 
index levels from 1995-2012. Figure 2 presents the log of aggregate investments 
during the same period. Aggregate investment is defined as the total business 
spending on fixed assets, such as factories, machinery, equipment, dwellings, and 
inventories of raw materials, which provide the basis for future production. The 
two graphs reflect episodes of a strong association between the stock market and 
investment. In fact, the two graphs look almost similar which reflects the strong 
relationship between investments and the stock market. We can see that during 
the Dot-com bubble, which reached its climax in 2000, the S&P index dropped 
significantly and the aggregate investments followed the same pattern. During the 
latest subprime mortgage crisis in 2007-2008 the same scenario transpired. 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of our sample based on the level 
of competition. In panel A, we present the statistics for all the firms constituting 
our sample. We divide our sample into quintiles based on the level of competition 
faced by a firm following the Herfindahl measure of competition. Panels B 
through F present statistics for firms in quintile 1 (firms facing the lowest level of 
competition) through quintile 5 (firms facing the highest level of competition) 
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respectively. The sample period is from 1996 to 2008. One salient observation is 
that as the level of competition increases from quintile one to quintile five, capital 
expenditure (a key component of a firm’s investment) increases as well. Capital 
expenditure increases from 251.317 to 445.643 as we move from the firms facing 
the lowest competition sample to the firms facing the highest competition one. 
These results reflect the fact that there is a positive relationship between a firm’s 
investment and the level of competition it’s facing from its competitors and hence 
reinforce our first hypothesis which states that Managers of firms facing a higher 
level of competition from their peers are more sensitive to the information in their 
stock price movements compared to firm facing a lower level of competition. 
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of our sample based on the level 
of threat. In panel A, we present the statistics for all the firms constituting our 
sample. We divide our sample into quintiles based on the level of threat faced by 
a firm following Hoberg, Philips, and Praphala (2013) measure of threat. Panels B 
through F present statistics for firms in quintile 1 (least threatened firms) through 
quintile 5 (most threatened firms) respectively. The sample period is from 1996 to 
2008. One salient observation is that as the product market threat increase from 
quintile one to quintile five, capital expenditure (a key component of a firm’s 
investment) increases as well. Capital expenditure increases from 57.07 to 66.08 
as we move from the least threatened firms’ sample to the most threatened one. 
Also, Q increases steadily from 1.97 to 2.42 as we move from the first to the fifth 
quintile. This proves that the stock price sensitivity is related to the threat faced 
by a firm. These results reflect the fact that there is a positive relationship 
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between a firm’s investment and the threat it’s facing from its competitors and 
hence reinforce our first hypothesis which states that Managers of firms facing a 
higher threat from their peers are more sensitive to the information in their stock 
price movements compared to less threatened firms. 
Table 5 presents the Pearson’s correlation between the level of 
competition a firm is facing and its capital expenditure. We can see that the 
correlation becomes stronger as we move from the sample of firms facing the 
highest level of competition to the sample of firms facing the highest level of 
competition from its peers. The correlation between capital expenditure and a 
firm’s threat is equal to 0.007257 and increases to 0.18593 for firms facing the 
highest level of competition. These results also reinforce our first hypothesis and 
suggest that the correlation between competition and capital investment becomes 
stronger as the level of competition a firm is facing goes up. 
Table 6 presents the Pearson’s correlation between the level of private 
information of a firm and its capital expenditure. We can see that the correlation 
becomes stronger as we move from the sample of firms having the least level of 
private information to the sample of firms having the highest level of private 
information. The correlation between capital expenditure and a firm’s level of 
private of information is equal to -0.011 for firms having the lowest level of 
private information and increases to 0.001 for firms having the highest level of 
private information. Again, these results reinforce our first hypothesis and suggest 
that the correlation between threat and investment becomes stronger as the level 
of private information increases.. 
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Table 7 presents the Pearson’s correlation between a firm’s threat and its 
capital expenditure. We can see that the correlation becomes stronger as we move 
from the sample of firms facing the least threat to the sample of firms facing the 
greatest threat from its peers. The correlation between capital expenditure and a 
firm’s threat is equal to -0.04471 and is not statistically significant while it’s 
statistically significant and equal to 0.02410 for most threatened firms. These 
results also reinforce our first hypothesis and suggest that the correlation between 
threat and investment becomes stronger as threat increases 
 
Table 8 presents the regression described in equation (3) and controls for 
the industry and year effects. Regression (1) regresses a firm’s investment 
(defined as capital expenditure plus research and development expenses scaled by 
lagged total assets) on Q (defined as the market value of equity plus book value of 
assets minus book value of equity scaled by book value of assets), probability of 
informed trading (PIN), and the interaction of the probability of the information 
of information trading (PIN) and Q which is represented as PIN*Q.  The 
coefficient of 7.34 pertaining to PIN*Q, which is statistically and economically 
significant, reinforces the idea that managers do learn from the information 
contained in their firm’s stock price movement when making investment 
decisions, concurs with previous empirical findings, and lends support to the 
active informant hypothesis . Regression (2) regresses a firm’s investment on Q, 
the probability of informed trading (PIN), the interaction of the probability of the 
information of information trading  and Q ( PIN*Q), the value-weighted market 
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adjusted firm return for next three years (RET), cash flow (CF), and inverse of 
lagged asset (Inv_Asset). This regression reiterated the results obtained in the 
regression (1) even after we controlled for return, cash flow, and size. The 
coefficient of 1.65 is both statistically and economically significant and concurs 
with our first regression results. We could also add that the R-square increases 
from 43% in the first regression to 47% in the second regression which further 
validates the explanatory power of the added control variables. 
Table 9 performs the same regression as the one performed in Table 8 but 
uses the adjusted probability of informed trading as a measure of private 
information in a firm. Table 9 presents the regression described in equation (3) 
and controls for the industry and year effects. Regression (1) regresses a firm’s 
investment (defined as capital expenditure plus research and development 
expenses scaled by lagged total assets) on Q (defined as the market value of 
equity plus book value of assets minus book value of equity scaled by book value 
of assets), the adjusted probability of informed trading (APIN), and the interaction 
of the adjusted probability of the information of information trading (APIN) and 
Q which is represented as APIN*Q.  The coefficient of 4.08 pertaining to 
APIN*Q, which is statistically and economically significant, reinforces the idea 
that managers do learn from the information contained in their firm’s stock price 
movement when making investment decisions, concurs with previous empirical 
findings, and lends support to the active informant hypothesis . Regression (2) 
regresses a firm’s investment on Q, the adjusted probability of informed trading 
(APIN), the interaction of the adjusted probability of the information of 
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information trading  and Q ( APIN*Q), the value-weighted market adjusted firm 
return for next three years (RET), cash flow (CF), and inverse of lagged asset 
(Inv_Asset). This regression reiterated the results obtained in the regression (1) 
even after we controlled for return, cash flow, and size. The coefficient of 2.7319 
is both statistically and economically significant and concurs with our first 
regression results. We could also add that the R-square increases from 29% in the 
first regression to 33% in the second regression which also further validates the 
explanatory power of the added control variables. 
Table 10 performs the same regression as the one performed in Table 8 
but uses the Roll’s measure as a measure of private information in a firm. Table 
10 presents the regression described in equation (3) and controls for the industry 
and year effects. Regression (1) regresses a firm’s investment (defined as capital 
expenditure plus research and development expenses scaled by lagged total 
assets) on Q (defined as the market value of equity plus book value of assets 
minus book value of equity scaled by book value of assets), the level of private 
information (INFO), and the interaction of the level of informed trading (INFO) 
and Q which is represented as INFO*Q.  The coefficient of 2.02 pertaining to 
INFO*Q, which is statistically and economically significant, also reinforces the 
idea that managers do learn from the information contained in their firm’s stock 
price movement when making investment decisions, concurs with previous 
empirical findings, and lends support to the active informant hypothesis . 
Regression (2) regresses a firm’s investment on Q, the level of informed trading 
(info), the interaction of the level of informed trading and Q ( INFO*Q), the 
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value-weighted market adjusted firm return for next three years (RET), cash flow 
(CF), and inverse of lagged asset (Inv_Asset). This regression reiterated the 
results obtained in the regression (1) even after we controlled for return, cash 
flow, and size. The coefficient of 2.29 is both statistically and economically 
significant and concurs with our first regression results. In the same vein as in 
tables 9 and 9, we could also add that the R-square increases from 34% in the first 
regression to 43% in the second regression which also further validates the 
explanatory power of the added control variables. 
Table 11 investigates the firms’ investment sensitivity to the information 
in their own stock price inside information and its link to the level of competition 
measured by the Herfindahl index. We divide our sample into quintiles based on 
the Herfindahl index measure, where quintile one presents the firms facing the 
highest level of competition sample and quintile five presents firms facing the 
highest level of competition sample respectively. Regressions (1) and (2) 
implement the regression described in equation (3) for the least threatened firms’ 
sample. Regressions (3) and (4) implement the regression described in equation 
(3) for the most threatened firms’ sample. The coefficient pertaining to the 
interaction of a firm’s investment to the private information contained in the stock 
price movements (PIN*Q) increases from a negative value of -8.98 to 6.226 when 
we move from the sample of firms facing the highest level of competition in 
regression (1) to the sample of firms facing the highest level of competition in 
regression.(3). These results certainly support our first hypothesis and show that 
firm managers are more sensitive to their stock price movements as the level of 
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competition from peers increases. Once we control for return, cash flow, and size 
in regression (2) and (4) our results still lead to the same conclusion. The 
coefficient related the (PIN*Q) increases from -4.10 to 18.14 when we move from 
firms facing the lowest level of competition to firms facing the highest level of 
competition.  
Table 12 investigates the firms’ investment sensitivity to the information 
in their own stock price inside information and its link to the product market 
threat. We divide our sample into quintiles based on Hoberg and Philips, Prabhala 
(2013) measure of threat, where quintile one presents the least threatened firms 
sample and quintile five presents the most threatened firms sample respectively. 
Regressions (1) and (2) implement the regression described in equation (3) for the 
least threatened firms’ sample. Regressions (3) and (4) implement the regression 
described in equation (3) for the most threatened firms’ sample. The coefficient 
pertaining to the interaction of a firm’s investment to the private information 
contained  in the stock price movements (PIN*Q) increases from 2.51 to 6.23 
when we move from the least threatened firms in regression (1) to the most 
threatened firms in regression (3). These results clearly support our first 
hypothesis and show that firm managers are more sensitive to their stock price 
movements as the threat from their rivals is greater. Once we control for return, 
cash flow, and size in regression (2) and (4) our results still lead to the same 
conclusion. The coefficient related the (PIN*Q) increases from 1.64 to 3.91 when 
we move from the least threatened firms to most threatened firms.  
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Table 13 investigates the Firms’ Investment sensitivity to peers’ stock 
price movements using the Herfindahl index as a measure of the level of 
competition. It also presents the regression of firm’s investment I on the firm’s Q 
((Q_Firm) and its peers’ Q (Q_peer). control for the year effect and the industry 
effect.  We divide our sample into quintiles based on the level of competition 
measure by the Herfindahl index. We perform the regression for all quintiles, 
where quintile one presents firms facing the lowest level of competition and 
quintile five presents firms facing the highest level of competition. In the first 
quintile, the coefficient related to the price of the firm (Q_Firm) has a value of 
2.72 and the one pertaining to the peer firms (Q_Peer) has a value of 0.25. As we 
move from the first quintile (most competition) to the fifth quintile (most 
competition), the coefficient related to Q_Firm increase of 1.08916 from the first 
quintile to the values of 3.45, 6.73, and 7.65 for third, fourth, and fifth quintiles 
respectively. All those values are economically and statistically significant. We 
can see that there is a significant increase in the level of attention a firm’s 
managers pay to movement in its stock price as the level of competition goes up.  
.  
Table 14 investigates the Firms’ Investment sensitivity to peers’ stock 
price movements and its relationship with the product market threat. It presents 
the regression of firm’s investment I on the firm’s Q ((Q_Firm) and its peers’ Q 
(Q_peer) . We control for the year effect and the industry effect.  We divide our 
sample into quintiles based on Hoberg, Philips, and Prabhala (2013) measure of 
threat. We perform the regression for all quintiles, where quintile one presents the 
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least threatened firms sample and quintile five presents the most threatened firms 
sample respectively. In the first quintile, the coefficient related to the price of the 
firm (Q_Firm) has a value of 1.08916 and the one pertaining to the peer firms 
(Q_Peer) has a value of 0.095559. As we move from the first quintile (least 
threatened firms) to the fifth quintile (most threatened firms), the coefficient 
related to Q_Firm increase of 1.08916 from the first quintile to the values of  
1.10915, 2.41347, 5.65501, and 4.62822 for the second, third, fourth, and fifth 
quintile respectively. All those values are economically and statistically 
significant. We can see that there is a significant increase in the level of attention 
a firm’s managers pay to movement in its stock price as the level of threat 
increases.  The coefficients related to Q_Peer give us an insight about how 
managers react to the movements in their peers’ stock prices. We can see that the 
coefficient increases from 0.09559 for the least threatened firms to 0.12269, 
0.13477, and 0.14295 for the second, third, and fourth quintiles respectively. 
When the level of threat reaches its highest level in quintile five, the coefficient 
drops to negative value -0.08644 which seems to indicate that when facing a very 
high level of competition, firm managers tend to cease to look at the stock price 
movements of their peers and retrench.  
Table 15 investigates firms’ Investment sensitivity to peers’ stock price 
inside information for all the firms in our sample. It presents the regression 
described in equation (4) by regressing of firm’s investment I (defined as capital 
expenditure plus research and development expenses scaled by lagged total 
assets) on its cash flow (CF_Firm) and the inverse of its lagged asset 
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(Inv_Asset_Firm), its peers’ Q (defined as the market value of equity plus book 
value of assets minus book value of equity scaled by book value of assets), and its 
peers’ probability of informed trading (PIN). The values of 1.20 and 1.57 related 
to the regressor PIN*Q in regression (1) and (2) respectively are both statistically 
and economically significant and suggest that firm managers do indeed learn from 
the inside information in their peers’ stock price movements. Table  divides the 
sample into quintiles based on the level of threat faced by the firm and performs 
the same regressions.  We can see that in regression (1) the coefficient related to 
PIN*Q moves from -0.46081 and -0.66202 in the first quintile and the second 
quintile where the level of competition is small to 2.98666 and 5.95565 in the 
third and fourth quintiles where the level of competition is greater. We also can 
see that when the level of threat is at its highest level (fifth quintile) the 
coefficient drops to 1.1855 which indicates that managers tend to retrench when 
the level of threat is very high. The same results hold when we control for a firm’s 
size and cash flow.                           
Table 16 investigates firms’ Investment sensitivity to peers’ stock price 
inside information for all the firms in our sample. It presents the regression 
described in equation (4) by regressing of firm’s investment I (defined as capital 
expenditure plus research and development expenses scaled by lagged total 
assets) on its cash flow (CF_Firm) and the inverse of its lagged asset 
(Inv_Asset_Firm), its peers’ Q (defined as the market value of equity plus book 
value of assets minus book value of equity scaled by book value of assets), and its 
peers’ adjusted probability of informed trading (APIN). The values of 3.16 and 
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1.73 related to the regressor APIN*Q in regression (1) and (2) respectively are 
both statistically and economically significant and suggest that firm managers do 
indeed learn from the inside information in their peers’ stock price movements.  
Table 17 examines firms’ Investment sensitivity to peers’ stock price 
inside information for all the firms in our sample. It presents the regression 
described in equation (4) by regressing of firm’s investment i (defined as capital 
expenditure plus research and development expenses scaled by lagged total 
assets) on its cash flow (CF_Firm) and the inverse of its lagged asset 
(Inv_Asset_Firm), its peers’ Q (defined as the market value of equity plus book 
value of assets minus book value of equity scaled by book value of assets), and its 
peers’ probability of informed trading (PIN). The values of 3.84 and 3.25 related 
to the regressor PIN*Q in regression (1) and (2) respectively are both statistically 
and economically significant and suggest that firm managers do indeed learn from 
the inside information in their peers’ stock price movements.  
Table 18 divides the sample into quintiles based on the level of 
competition faced by the firm and performs the same regressions.  We can see 
that in regression (1) the coefficient related to PIN*Q moves from -0.89 and 0.39 
in the first quintile and the second quintile where the level of competition is small 
to 0.99 and 2.64 in the third and fourth quintiles where the level of competition is 
greater. We also can see that when the level of threat is at its highest level (fifth 
quintile) the coefficient drops to 1.49 which indicates that managers tend to 
retrench when the level of threat is very high. However, when we control for the 
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firm’s size and cash flow, our regression results do not give up any signs of 
retrenchment.  
Table 19 divides the sample into quintiles based on the level of threat 
faced by the firm and performs the same regressions.  We can see that in 
regression (1) the coefficient related to PIN*Q moves from -0.46081 and -
0.66202 in the first quintile and the second quintile where the level of competition 
is small to 2.98666 and 5.95565 in the third and fourth quintiles where the level of 
competition is greater. We also can see that when the level of threat is at its 
highest level (fifth quintile) the coefficient drops to 1.1855 which indicates that 
managers tend to retrench when the level of threat is very high. The same results 
hold when we control for a firm’s size and cash flow.  
In order to verify whether our analysis has a sample bias problem, we use 
the Heckman measure as an additional robustness check to see whether sample 
bias exists. Our results show that there is no sample bias issue and our regressions 
yield the same results.                      
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                                                CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation contributes to the literature that studies the interaction between 
product market competition and firm’s financial policies. The empirical findings 
lend support to the “active informant hypothesis” and confirm that firms do learn 
from their stock price movements and their learning gets accentuated when the 
level of threat from competitors is higher. The empirical results also confirm that 
firms do learn from the stock price movements and their learning increases as the 
threat from peers is higher expect when the firm is facing the greatest level of 
threat. This dissertation also reinforces the hypothesis which contends that 
competition and rivalry induce firm managers to work more efficiently. We 
proved that when facing a greater competition, firm managers are more attentive 
to the information in their stock price movements and the ones of their peers. We 
are tempted to explain behind the fact that at the highest level of threat firms 
cease to learn from the stock price movement of their peers by a phenomenon of 
retrenchment. I believe that this particular finding could lead to further research 
pertaining to the psychology of managers when facing very high competition 
levels and would lead up to a deeper insight about firm managers reaction to 
competition. My hope is that this study inspires future work on better 
understanding the mechanisms driving the strong interdependencies among 
financial policies. 
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Table 1: Variable definitions 
The table provides the definitions of the main variables used in the analysis. 
Variable Definition 
CAPEXRD Calculated as capital expenditure plus R&D scaled by beginning-
of-year assets (%) 
 
CAPEX The capital expenditure scaled by beginning-of-year assets (%) 
 
R&D Research and development expenses 
 
Q Computed as market value of equity plus book value of assets 
minus book value of equity divided by book value of assets 
 
INFO 
 
Herfindahl 
 
 
PIN 
 
APIN 
Measure of private information following Roll (1988) 
 
Four-digit SIC industry concentration ratios gathered in the 
Census of Manufacturers  
 
Probability of informed trading in a stock measure by  
 
Adjusted probability of informed trading in a stock measure by 
Duarte and Young (2007) 
 
CF Net income before extraordinary item plus depreciation and 
amortization expenses plus R&D expense, divided by lagged 
assets 
 
RET Value-weighted market return adjusted firm return for next three 
years 
 
ASSET Total book value of assets in billions of dollars 
 
INV_AST Inverse of total assets 
 
Fluidity Firm’s competition threat measure by Hoberg, Philips, and 
Prabhala (2013) 
 
INV Capital expenditure plus R&D scaled by beginning-of-year assets 
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Table 2: Sample descriptive statistics 
This table shows the number of firm year observations for each datasets and the summary 
statistics of the main variables. Panel A presents the TNIC sample from Hoberg and 
Philips (2012), the Threat sample from Hoberg, Philips, and Prabhala (2013), 
COMPUSTAT sample, probability of informed trading PIN sample from Duarte and 
Young (2007), and our final sample which is obtained by merging all the data sample 
mentioned previously. Panel B provides the descriptive statistics of variables including 
Threat, Q, PIN, and INV. The definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. 
 
Panel A: Sample 
Sample Number of Firm Year Observations 
 
TNIC Sample 
 
99,592 
Threat Sample 65,535 
COMPUSTAT 55,787 
PIN Sample 48,294 
Final Sample 44,716 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Min P5 P25 Mean Median P75 P95 Max Std 
Dev. 
 
INFO                 
Herfindahl 
Threat 
 
  0            
  
0.035     
0.33 
 
0.22            
  
0.067        
2.44 
 
0.44       
  
0.135        
4.58 
 
 0.62        
  
0.339 
6.95 
 
0.63        
  0.227 
6.40 
 
0.81       
 0.452     
9.22 
 
0.95        
1.00 
13.79 
 
0.99 
 1.00 
27.26 
 
   0.23 
  0.264 
3.40 
Q 0.06 0.67 0.96 1.95 1.41 1.74 3.73 59.13 1.50 
PIN 0 0.07 0.10 0.16 0.14 0.19 0.37 0.87 0.09 
APIN 0 0.07 0.09 0.14 0.12 0.16 0.28 0.70 0.07 
INV 0 0 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.20 6.07 0.20 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics across quintiles using Herfindahl measure  
This table shows the statistics of the main variables for all firms and across quintiles based on the 
level of competition using the Herfindahl index. Panel A reports the mean, median and standard 
deviation of variables including Herfindahl, ASSET, CAPEX, Q, and CF for all firms. Then we 
divide the sample into quintiles based on the Herfindahl measure and report the mean, median, 
and standard deviation of the variables in each quintile in Panel B through Panel F. Q1 represents 
the group firms facing the least competition while Q5 is the group of firms facing the most 
competition. The definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. The sample period is from 
1996 to 2008. 
 Mean Median Std. Dev.  Mean Median Std. Dev. 
 Panel A: All Firms  Panel B: Q1 
Herfindahl 0.339 0.272 0.264  0.792 0.799 0.174 
ASSET 1975.811 1961.287 9042.272  3279.839 1669.370 1638.274 
CAPEX 375.664 65.000 1071.07  251.317 37.898 870.042 
Q 1.645 1.253 1.533  1.588 1.224 1.473 
CF 0.068 0.074 0.328  0.056 0.079 0.601 
        
 Panel C: Q2  Panel D: Q3 
Herfindahl 0.403 0.398 0.056  0.257 0.272 0.036 
ASSET 1098.098 149.797 4218.484  1981.566 182.391 7418.197 
CAPEX 280.102 49.081 774.040  472.475 82.191 1361.380 
Q    1.689 1.349 1.659     1.592 1.241 1.708 
CF 0.079 0.091 0.212  0.058 0.076 0.287 
        
 
 
Panel E: Q4  Panel F: Q5 
Herfindahl 0.155 0.146 0.023  0.082 0.077 0.028 
ASSET 1957.636 226.1 5608.998  1561.014 276.203 5685.281 
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CAPEX 426.823 40.655 1383.60  445.643 145.710 757.236 
Q    1.879 1.308 1.729  1.488 1.203 0.919 
CF 0.066 0.062 0.166  0.082 0.066 0.141 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics across quintiles using Threat measure  
This table shows the statistics of the main variables for all firms and across quintiles based on the 
level of threat. Panel A reports the mean, median and standard deviation of variables including 
Threat, ASSET, CAPEX, Q, and CF for all firms. Then we divide the sample into quintiles based 
on the level of threat (Threat) and report the mean, median, and standard deviation of the 
variables in each quintile in Panel B through Panel F. Q1 represents the group of the least 
threatened firms while Q5 is the group of the most threatened firms. The definitions of the 
variables are provided in Table 1. The sample period is from 1996 to 2008. 
 Mean Median Std. 
Dev. 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. 
 Panel A: All Firms  Panel B: Q1 
Threat 6.95 6.40 3.39  2.92 3.05 0.76 
ASSET 1533.05 233.50 3077  1378.96 233.66 2787.89 
CAPEX 57.59 7.04 117.52  57.06 8.58 113.04 
Q 1.95 1.41 1.39  1.62 1.29 1.01 
CF -0.01 0.06 0.22  0.06 0.08 0.14 
        
 Panel C: Q2  Panel D: Q3 
Threat 4.80 4.80 0.46  6.41 6.40 0.50 
ASSET 1287.41 225.68 2728.76  1353.89 202.34 2840.20 
CAPEX 52.94 8.45 107.88  52.05 7.08 108.23 
Q 1.74 1.34 1.16  1.91 1.41 1.33 
CF 0.04 0.07 0.18  0.01 0.06 0.20 
        
 Panel E: Q4  Panel F: Q5 
Threat 8.38 8.33 0.68  12.24 11.64 2.22 
ASSET 1642.24 225.43 3239.17  2002.73 293.32 3639.20 
CAPEX 59.13 6.29 121.86  66.80 5.22 133.97 
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Q 2.07 1.49 1.47  2.42 1.67 1.73 
CF -0.02 0.05 0.23  -0.10 0.01 0.29 
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Table 5: Correlation between the competition faced by a firm and its capital 
expenditure using the Herfindahl measure 
This table shows the Pearson’s correlation between the competition faced by a firm 
(measured by the Herfindahl index) and its capital expenditure. We divide the sample 
into quintiles based on the level of competition faced by a firm. Q1 represents the group 
of firms facing the least competition while Q5 is the group firms facing the most 
competition. The definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. The sample period 
is from 1996 to 2008. 
Quintile Corr (Herfindahl, CAPEX) p-value 
Q1 (Lowest Comp.) 0.07257 <0.001 
Q2 -0.03894 <0.001 
Q3 0.01701 0.0014 
Q4 0.12338 <0.001 
Q5 (Highest Comp.) 0.18593 <0.001 
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Table 6: Correlation between a firm’s threat and its capital expenditure using the 
Fluidity measure 
This table shows the Pearson’s correlation between a firm’s threat and its capital 
expenditure. We divide the sample into quintiles based on the level of threat. Q1 
represents the group of the least threatened firms while Q5 is the group of the most 
threatened firms. The definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. The sample 
period is from 1996 to 2008. 
Quintile Corr (Threat, CAPEX) p-value 
Q1 (Lowest Threat) -0.045 <0.001 
Q2 -0.002 0.822 
Q3 0.012 0.249 
Q4 0.004 0.704 
Q5 (Highest Threat) 0.024 0.020 
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Table 7: Correlation between a firm’s threat and its capital expenditure using the 
Information Measure 
This table shows the Pearson’s correlation between a firm’s level of private information 
and its capital expenditure. We divide the sample into quintiles based on the level of 
information. Q1 represents the group of firms with the lowest level of private information 
while Q5 is the group of firms with the highest level of private information threatened 
firms. The definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. The sample period is from 
1996 to 2008. 
Quintile   Corr (Info, CAPEX) p-value 
Q1 (Lowest INFO)                     -0.011 <0.039 
Q2 -0.02 <0.001 
Q3    0.012 0.026 
Q4    0.052 <0.001 
Q5 (Highest Threat)    0.001  0.016 
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Table 8: Firms’ investment sensitivity to stock price inside information using 
PIN measure 
This table shows the results of the baseline regressions. The dependent variable is 
CAPEXRD. The independent variables include Q, PIN, the interaction between PIN and 
Q, the interaction between PIN and CF, CF, RET, and INV_AST. The definitions of the 
variables are provided in Table 1. We control for the year effect and the industry effect. 
The intercept coefficients are not shown here. ***, **, ** indicate a two-tailed test 
significance level of less than 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. The sample period is from 
1996 to 2008. 
 (1) (2) 
Q 2.54*** 1.27*** 
 (61.62) (29.43) 
PIN -4.97*** -13.39*** 
 (-12.97) (-31.31) 
PIN*Q  7.34*** 1.65*** 
 (38.37) (45.26) 
PIN*CF  17.53*** 
  (22.30) 
CF  2.83*** 
  (9.22) 
RET  -0.22* 
  (-2.12) 
INV_AST     0.059*** 
  (75.99) 
Year effect Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes 
Adjusted R
2 
0.43 0.47 
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Table 9: Firms’ investment sensitivity to stock price inside information using 
Adjusted PIN measure 
This table shows the results of the baseline regressions. The dependent variable is 
CAPEXRD. The independent variables include Q, APIN, the interaction between PIN 
and Q, the interaction between PIN and CF, CF, RET, and INV_AST. The definitions of 
the variables are provided in Table 1. We control for the year effect and the industry 
effect. The intercept coefficients are not shown here. ***, **, ** indicate a two-tailed test 
significance level of less than 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. The sample period is from 
1996 to 2008. 
 (1) (2) 
Q 0.61*** 0.42*** 
 (5.06) (3.29) 
APIN -4.94*** -4.72*** 
 (-3.36) (-3.23) 
APIN*Q 4.08*** 2.73*** 
 (4.33) (2.80) 
PIN*CF  38.25* 
  (1.79) 
CF  32.27*** 
  (8.62) 
RET  -0.44 
  (-1.07) 
INV_AST  0.03*** 
  (4.07) 
Year effect Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes 
Adjusted R
2 
0.29 0.33 
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Table 10: Firms’ investment sensitivity to stock price inside information using 
Roll’s private information measure 
This table shows the results of the baseline regressions. The dependent variable is CAPEXRD. 
The independent variables include Q, PIN, the interaction between INFO and Q, the interaction 
between INFO and CF, CF, RET, and INV_AST. The definitions of the variables are provided in 
Table 1. We control for the year effect and the industry effect. The intercept coefficients are not 
shown here. ***, **, ** indicate a two-tailed test significance level of less than 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively. The sample period is from 1996 to 2008. 
 (1) (2) 
Q 0.94*** -0.28*** 
 (21.73) (-6.57) 
INFO -3.01*** -3.11*** 
 (-18.50) (-19.50) 
INFO*Q  2.02*** 2.29*** 
 (30.85) (35.08) 
INFO*CF  24.85*** 
  (15.53) 
CF  34.96*** 
  (30.74) 
RET  -0.52*** 
  (-3.52) 
INV_AST     0.10*** 
  (15.99) 
Year effect Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes 
Adjusted R
2 
0.34 0.43 
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Table 11: Firms’ investment sensitivity to own stock price inside information and 
product market competition using Herfindahl measure and PIN measure 
This table shows the results of the regressions in two extreme groups: the firms facing high 
competition and firms facing least competition. We divide the sample into quintiles based on the 
level of faced competition (Q1-Q5). The firms facing the most competition are in Q1 while the 
firms facing the most competition are in Q5. The dependent variable is CAPEXRD. The 
independent variables include Q, PIN, the interaction between PIN and Q, the interaction between 
PIN and CF, CF, RET, and INV_AST. The definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. 
We control for the year effect and the industry effect. The intercept coefficients are not shown 
here. ***, **, ** indicate a two-tailed test significance level of less than 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively. The sample period is from 1996 to 2008. 
 Least Competition  Highest Competition  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Q 4.77*** 3.59***  -2.53*** -1.88*** 
 (97.52) (62.16)  (-11.97) (-11.52) 
PIN 15.74** -0.26  -71.28*** -38.57*** 
 (35.87) (-0.50)  (-38.23) (-28.49) 
PIN*Q -8.98*** -4.10  55.73*** 18.14*** 
 (-46.20) (-13.51)  (53.68) (21.67) 
PIN*CF  60.98*   -39.85*** 
  (41.97)   (-6.98) 
CF  23.86***   24.36*** 
  (39.13)   (19.36) 
RET  0.76   0.34 
  (0.86)   (-0.89) 
INV_AST  0.06   0.46*** 
  (29.18)   (162.79) 
Year effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
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Adjusted R
2 
0.52 0.58  0.42 0.70 
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Table 12: Firms’ investment sensitivity to own stock price inside information and 
product market competition using Threat measure and PIN measure 
This table shows the results of the regressions in two extreme groups: the less threatened firms 
and the most threatened firms. We divide the sample into quintiles based on the level of threat 
(Q1-Q5). The less threatened firms are in Q1 while the most threatened firms are in Q5. The 
dependent variable is CAPEXRD. The independent variables include Q, PIN, the interaction 
between PIN and Q, the interaction between PIN and CF, CF, RET, and INV_AST. The 
definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. We control for the year effect and the 
industry effect. The intercept coefficients are not shown here. ***, **, ** indicate a two-tailed 
test significance level of less than 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. The sample period is from 
1996 to 2008. 
 Less Threatened Firms  Most Threatened Firms 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Q 0.77*** 0.27  -0.30 -0.24 
 (4.55) (1.46)  (-0.77) (-0.50) 
PIN -3.91** -1.10  -20.07*** -17.70*** 
 (-2.21) (-0.62)  (-3.04) (-2.70) 
PIN*Q 2.51* 1.64  6.23** 3.91 
 (1.98) (-0.62)  (2.11) (1.23) 
PIN*CF  -52.82*   -161.60 
  (-1.80)   (-1.64) 
CF  51.92***   44.67*** 
  (8.65)   (3.11) 
RET  0.43   -2.55* 
  (0.66)   (-1.92) 
INV_AST  -0.01   0.11*** 
  (-0.64)   (3.78) 
Year effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
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Adjusted R
2 
0.29 0.33  0.41 0.43 
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Table 13: Firms’ investment sensitivity to peers’ stock price movements using 
Herfindahl measure 
This table shows the results of the regressions of a firm’s investment on its peers’ stock 
price movements across quintiles. We divide the sample into quintiles based on the level 
of threat (Q1-Q5). The less threatened firms are in Q1 while the most threatened firms are 
in Q5. The dependent variable is CAPEXRD. The independent variables include the 
firm’s Q (Q_Firm), and its peers’ Q (Q_peer). The definitions of the variables are 
provided in Table 1. We control for the year effect and the industry effect. The intercept 
coefficients are not shown here. ***, **, ** indicate a two-tailed test significance level of 
less than 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. The sample period is from 1996 to 2008. 
 Q1  
(Least Comp.) 
Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
(Highest Comp.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Q_Firm 2.72*** 2.34*** 3.45*** 6.73*** 7.65*** 
 (109.75) (115.64) (138.16) (143.41) (78.04) 
Q_Peer 0.25*** 0.15*** 0.09*** 0.01 0.03*** 
 (10.55) (9.72) (6.27) (0.49) (0.69) 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R 0.49 0.54 0.58 0.51 0.37 
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Table 14: Firms’ investment sensitivity to peers’ stock price movements using 
Threat measure 
This table shows the results of the regressions of a firm’s investment on its peers’ stock 
price movements across quintiles. We divide the sample into quintiles based on the level 
of threat (Q1-Q5). The less threatened firms are in Q1 while the most threatened firms are 
in Q5. The dependent variable is CAPEXRD. The independent variables include the 
firm’s Q (Q_Firm), and its peers’ Q (Q_peer). The definitions of the variables are 
provided in Table 1. We control for the year effect and the industry effect. The intercept 
coefficients are not shown here. ***, **, ** indicate a two-tailed test significance level of 
less than 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. The sample period is from 1996 to 2008. 
 Q1  
(Least Threatened 
Firms) 
Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
(Most Threatened 
Firms) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Q_Firm 1.09*** 1.11*** 2.41*** 5.66*** 4.63*** 
 (73.11) (46.85) (99.68) (17.83) (13.11) 
Q_Peer 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.14*** -0.09*** 
 (5.88) (8.72) (9.49) (5.51) (-3.57) 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R 0.42 0.34 0.47 0.48 0.42 
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Table 15: Firms’ Investment sensitivity to peers’ stock price inside information 
using Herfindahl measure and PIN measure 
This table shows the results of the regressions of a firm’s investment sensitivity to peers’ 
stock price inside information. The dependent variable is CAPEXRD. The independent 
variables include its peers’ Q (Q_Peer), its peers’ PIN (PIN_Peer), the interaction 
between PIN_Peer and Q_Peer, the firm’s CF (CF_Firm), and the firm’s inverse of the 
assets (INV_AST_Firm). The definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. We 
control for the year effect and the industry effect. The intercept coefficients are not 
shown here. ***, **, ** indicate a two-tailed test significance level of less than 1%, 5%, 
and 10% respectively. The sample period is from 1996 to 2008. 
 (1) (2) 
Q_Peer 0.38*** 0.71*** 
 (8.62) (12.08) 
PIN_Peer 0.96 0.74* 
 (0.38) (1.64) 
PIN_Peer*Q_Peer 1.20* 1.57** 
 (1.00) (2.17) 
CF_Firm  1.13** 
  (2.29) 
INV_AST_Firm  0.16*** 
  (82.97) 
Year effect Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes 
Adjusted R
2 
0.56 0.43 
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Table 16: Firms’ Investment sensitivity to peers’ stock price inside information 
using Herfindahl measure and APIN measure 
This table shows the results of the regressions of a firm’s investment sensitivity to peers’ 
stock price inside information. The dependent variable is CAPEXRD. The independent 
variables include its peers’ Q (Q_Peer), its peers’ PIN (PIN_Peer), the interaction 
between PIN_Peer and Q_Peer, the firm’s CF (CF_Firm), and the firm’s inverse of the 
assets (INV_AST_Firm). The definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. We 
control for the year effect and the industry effect. The intercept coefficients are not 
shown here. ***, **, ** indicate a two-tailed test significance level of less than 1%, 5%, 
and 10% respectively. The sample period is from 1996 to 2008. 
 (1) (2) 
Q_Peer 0.03* 0.85*** 
 (1.02) (14.54) 
APIN_Peer -3.07*** -2.29*** 
 (-6.76) (-3.79) 
APIN_Peer*Q_Peer 3.16*** 1.73*** 
 (14.93) (4.85) 
CF_Firm  0.13** 
  (2.29) 
INV_AST_Firm    0.16*** 
  (82.89) 
Year effect Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes 
Adjusted R
2 
0.25 0.43 
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Table 17: Firms’ Investment sensitivity to peers’ stock price inside information 
using fluidity measure and PIN measure 
This table shows the results of the regressions of a firm’s investment sensitivity to peers’ 
stock price inside information. The dependent variable is CAPEXRD. The independent 
variables include its peers’ Q (Q_Peer), its peers’ PIN (PIN_Peer), the interaction 
between PIN_Peer and Q_Peer, the firm’s CF (CF_Firm), and the firm’s inverse of the 
assets (INV_AST_Firm). The definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. We 
control for the year effect and the industry effect. The intercept coefficients are not 
shown here. ***, **, ** indicate a two-tailed test significance level of less than 1%, 5%, 
and 10% respectively. The sample period is from 1996 to 2008. 
 (1) (2) 
Q_Peer 0.13*** 0.17* 
 (4.80) (1.86) 
PIN_Peer -2.99*** -2.58*** 
 (-7.80) (-6.87) 
PIN_Peer*Q_Peer 3.84*** 3.25*** 
 (20.01) (17.29) 
CF_Firm  9.06*** 
  (119.90) 
INV_AST_Firm  -0.01*** 
  (-6.00) 
Year effect Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes 
Adjusted R
2 
0.23 0.26 
  
1
0
2 
Table 18: Firms’ investment sensitivity to peers’ stock price inside information and product market competition using 
Herfindahl index and PIN measure 
This table shows the results of the regressions across quintiles. We divide the sample into quintiles based on the level of 
threat (Q1-Q5). The less threatened firms are in Q1 while the most threatened firms are in Q5. The dependent variable is 
CAPEXRD. The independent variables include its peers’ Q (Q_Peer), its peers’ PIN (PIN_Peer), the interaction between 
PIN_Peer and Q_Peer, the firm’s CF (CF_Firm), and the firm’s inverse of the assets (INV_AST_Firm). The definitions of the 
variables are provided in Table 1. We control for the year effect and the industry effect. The intercept coefficients are not 
shown here. ***, **, ** indicate a two-tailed test significance level of less than 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. The sample 
period is from 1996 to 2008. 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Q_Peer 0.97*** 0.40*** -0.07* -0.25*** -0.15 0.71*** 0.27*** 0.63*** 0.022 -0.36* 
 (15.04)   (5.64) (-1.79) (-2.47) (-1.07) (5.55) (4.58) (7.67) (0.27) (-3.89) 
PIN_Peer 1.81***   -0.55 -2.77*** -1.29* 0.06 0.74* -0.80* 3.85*** -2.10 -2.64*** 
 (3.63) (-0.95) (-4.99) (-1.18) (0.05) (1.64) (-1.68) (5.65) (-2.41) (-3.23) 
PIN_Peer*Q_Peer -0.89*** 0.39* 0.99*** 2.64*** 1.49** -0.57** 0.004 0.35*** 0.72* 1.28*** 
 (-3.06) (1.20) (10.50) (5.73) (2.32) (-2.17) (0.02) (5.09) (1.97) (3.13) 
CF_Firm      -0.13** 4.85*** -6.18*** -0.28 16.12*** 
      (-2.29) (23.87) (-27.94) (0.61) (36.30) 
INV_AST_Firm      0.16*** 0.14*** 0.03 0.22*** 0.49*** 
      (82.97) (107.8) (44.97) (126) (201.6) 
  
1
0
3 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R
2 
0.31 0.36 0.36 0.19 0.25 0.43 0.56 0.48 0.49 0.69 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1
0
4 
 
Table 19: Firms’ investment sensitivity to peers’ stock price inside information and product market competition using 
Herfindahl index and APIN measure 
This table shows the results of the regressions across quintiles. We divide the sample into quintiles based on the level of 
competition faced by the firm (Q1-Q5). The firms facing the highest competition are in Q1 while the firms facing the least 
competition are in Q5. The dependent variable is CAPEXRD. The independent variables include its peers’ Q (Q_Peer), its 
peers’ PIN (PIN_Peer), the interaction between APIN_Peer and Q_Peer, the firm’s CF (CF_Firm), and the firm’s inverse of 
the assets (INV_AST_Firm). The definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. We control for the year effect and the 
industry effect. The intercept coefficients are not shown here. ***, **, ** indicate a two-tailed test significance level of less 
than 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. The sample period is from 1996 to 2008. 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Q_Peer 1.17*** 0.53*** -0.66* -0.10* -0.32** 0.85*** 0.32*** -0.14** -0.01 -0.31*** 
 (18.04) (11.43) (-11.28) (-1.81) (-2.68) (14.54) (8.44) (-2.66) (-0.26) (-4.05) 
APIN_Peer 4.00*** 0.58 -7.52*** -2.46* -3.59** 2.29* -0.19 -1.79** -2.87 -3.35*** 
 (6.01) (0.90) (-8.50) (-1.95) (-2.29) (3.79)*** (-0.36) (-2.24) (-2.86) (-3.27) 
APIN_Peer*Q_Peer -2.49* -0.35* 8.37*** 3.42*** 3.45*** -1.73 -0.42* 3.09*** 1.53*** 1.54*** 
 (-6.33) (-1.01) (17.80) (8.05) (4.48) (-4.85) (-1.48) (7.24) (4.53) (3.14) 
CF_Firm      -0.13** 4.85*** -6.13*** -0.26 16.11*** 
      (-2.29) (23.87) (-27.74) (-0.56) (36.27) 
INV_AST_Firm       0.16*** 0.14*** 0.03*** 0.22*** 0.49*** 
      (82.89) (107.79) (44.13) (125.94) (202.57) 
  
1
0
5 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R
2 
0.31 0.36 0.39 0.19 0.25 0.43 0.56 0.48 0.49 0.69 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1
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Table 20: Firms’ investment sensitivity to peers’ stock price inside information and product market competition using 
Fluidity measure and PIN measure 
This table shows the results of the regressions across quintiles. We divide the sample into quintiles based on the level of 
threat (Q1-Q5). The less threatened firms are in Q1 while the most threatened firms are in Q5. The dependent variable is 
CAPEXRD. The independent variables include its peers’ Q (Q_Peer), its peers’ PIN (PIN_Peer), the interaction between 
PIN_Peer and Q_Peer, the firm’s CF (CF_Firm), and the firm’s inverse of the assets (INV_AST_Firm). The definitions of the 
variables are provided in Table 1. We control for the year effect and the industry effect. The intercept coefficients are not 
shown here. ***, **, ** indicate a two-tailed test significance level of less than 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. The sample 
period is from 1996 to 2008. 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Q_Peer 0.31*** 0.29*** -0.07* -0.31*** 0.01 0.20*** 0.29*** -0.06 -0.11 0.10* 
 (8.29) (8.23) (-1.79) (-3.90) (0.12) (5.55) (8.21) (-1.67) (-1.46) (1.83) 
PIN_Peer -0.18 1.06** -2.77*** -2.90** 0.84 -0.66* 1.05** -2.74*** -0.99 -1.76*** 
 (-0.46) (2.26) (-4.99) (-2.35) (0.79) (-1.77) (2.25) (-4.94) (-0.86) (-0.90) 
PIN_Peer*Q_Peer -0.46* -0.66*** 2.99*** 5.96*** 1.19*** 0.04 -0.66*** 2.95*** 3.62*** -0.11 
 (-1.89) (-2.72) (10.50) (9.92) (2.81) (0.17) (-2.72) (10.37) (6.46) (-1.38) 
CF_Firm      -9.06*** 0.22*** 1.19*** 21.06*** -
17.76*** 
      (-11.90) (3.66) (4.23) (99.01) (-78.90) 
INV_AST_Firm      0.00 -0.01*** -0.01 -0.01*** -0.01*** 
      (0.45) (-3.13) (-0.91) (-3.50) (-6.00) 
  
1
0
7 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R
2 
0.37 0.32 0.39 0.23 0.35 0.40 0.32 0.39 0.33 0.36 
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                                                          Figure 1: S&P index Time Series 
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                                                  Figure 2: Aggregate Investment Time Series 
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Appendix 1 
Probability of Informed Trading 
According to Duarte and Young (2007) “Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara (1996) 
model is based on the Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Easley and O’Hara (1987) 
sequential trade models. The model contains both informed traders who trade for 
speculative purposes based on private information, and noise traders whose reasons 
for trading are exogenous. It also posits the existence of an uninformed liquidity 
provider who sets the bid and ask quotes by observing the flow of buy and sell 
orders, and assessing the probability that the orders come from informed traders. 
The bid-ask spread compensates the liquidity provider for the possibility of trading 
with the informed traders. At the beginning of each day, nature decides whether a 
private information event will occur. The probability that a private information 
event will occur on a given day is a. If a private information event occurs on a 
particular day, informed traders receive a private signal which is positive with 
probability d. If the signal is positive, buy order flow for that day arrives according 
to a Poisson distribution with intensity parameter µ+   and sell order flow arrives 
according to a Poisson distribution with intensity parameter   . The intuition is that 
on days with positive private information, both informed traders and noise traders 
arrive in the market as buyers. The total buy order flow for the day therefore 
consists of arrivals of both noise traders, who arrive at rate   , and informed 
traders who arrive at rate u. On the other hand, only noise traders arrive to sell, so 
the arrival rate of sell order flow is   . If the signal is negative, buy orders consist 
 111 
 
only of noise traders with intensity parameter   , and sell order flow arrives 
according to a Poisson distribution with intensity parameter    + µ to reflect both 
the arrivals of noise sellers and of informed sellers. If there is no private signal, 
only noise traders will arrive in the market, so buy and sell order flow arrives by 
Poisson distributions with intensity parameters    and    , respectively.  
The PIN is computed as: 
 
                                                     PIN= 
    
          
 
 
 
The intuition behind the formula for PIN is that the probability of informed trade is 
the ratio of expected informed order flow to expected total order flow.” 
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          Appendix 2 
 
A sample of Least Threatened 
Firms for 1997 (using threat 
measure)                                 
 
AAR CORP 
ABC DISPENSING 
TECHNOLOGIES 
ABERCROMBIE & FITCH  -CL 
A 
AIR T INC 
ALBERTSON'S INC 
ALCO STORES INC 
ALLOU HEALTHCARE INC 
AMERICAN GREETINGS  -CL 
A 
AMERICAN STORES CO 
AMES DEPT STORES INC 
ANGELICA CORP 
ANN INC 
APOGEE ENTERPRISES INC 
ASTRO-MED INC 
AVATEX CORP 
AZZ INC 
` A Sample of Most Threatened Firms for 1997 
 
             3COM CORP 
3DO CO 
A D A M INC 
ABAXIS INC 
ABIOMED INC 
ACTERNA CORP 
ACTIVE VOICE CORP 
ACTIVISION INC 
ACXIOM CORP 
ADELPHIA COMMUN  
ADM TRONICS UNLIMITED 
INC/DE 
ADVANCEPCS 
ALKERMES PLC 
ALMOST FAMILY INC 
AMERICAN WAGERING INC 
ANSOFT CORP 
APHTON CORP 
ARV ASSISTED LIVING INC 
ATC HEALTHCARE INC  
ATL PRODUCTS INC 
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